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PERMISSIVE CERTIFICATES: COLLECTORS OF ART
AS COLLECTORS OF PERMISSIONS
Peter J. Karol*
Abstract: Artists have been dramatically reshaping the fine art certificate of authenticity
since the 1960s. Where traditional certificates merely certified extant objects as authentic
works of a named artist, newer instruments purported both to authorize the creation of unbuilt
artworks and instruct buyers how to manifest and install them. Such “Permissive Certificates”
have fascinated contemporary art historians ever since. Prior scholarship has shown how such
documents, essentially blueprints for art creation, force us to confront fundamental ontological
questions on the nature of art, the relationship between artist, collector and viewer, and the
influence of money and acquisitiveness on art generation. But rarely, if ever, have they been
approached as legal instruments.
This Article accordingly fills that gap by construing Permissive Certificates through the
complex but potent array of legal rights that they define. It argues that Permissive Certificates
are not unitary instruments, but in fact an amalgamation of two distinct legal structures. They
couple narrow retrospective warranties on the one hand with prospective copyright licenses
and rights of source association on the other. Critically, as with all copyright and source-based
permissions, they are conditioned on the owner/licensee complying with use guidelines.
Material variations from such terms place the owner/licensee outside the scope of the license,
or otherwise in breach, and at risk of claims of infringement by the artist.
This approach to Permissive Certificates yields two important insights. First, they harbor
an unappreciated power as a tool for artist control, particularly in jurisdictions such as the U.S.
where moral rights remain relatively weak. Second, and more broadly, as art becomes
increasingly more dematerialized, digitized, and duplicable, and ever more legalized in turn,
Permissive Certificates will grow more and more into the locus of value for such works. Over
the long run, museums and other collectors of fine art will become collectors, not of objects,
but of permissions. The aura of the artist’s hand will be that of a signature and not of a
brushstroke.
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INTRODUCTION
He intended to invest in paper.
- Donald Judd on Count Giuseppe Panza1
In 1990, renowned conceptual and minimalist artist Donald Judd
authored an unrelenting four-part polemic against Giuseppe Panza, one of
the world’s foremost collectors of such art. The essay, Una stanza per
Panza, opened with a short, declarative first sentence: “Giuseppe Panza
makes my work himself, contrary to the original agreement that it be made
only under my supervision.”2
Given the thirty-plus pages of invective that follow (Judd launched into
an extended comparison of Panza to Richard Nixon just one paragraph
later),3 a reader could be excused for breezing by this sober opening
statement of the case. Judd, it seems, was establishing some factual
context to motivate the argument to come. A celebrated artist, Judd was
angry at a collector of his works because the collector did not follow an
agreement to make Judd’s art in a certain way.
Judd’s statement, however, is stranger and far more provocative than it
may at first appear. At a minimum, it raises a range of questions centering
around its passing reference to an “original agreement.” How could a
collector (that is, an art buyer) ever make an artist’s work in the artist’s
name? What “original agreement” is Judd alluding to that could delegate
such a power? Did Judd consent to this arrangement? If not, how could it
be enforceable? If so, what motivated the artist to cede the right to create
artwork in his name in the first place? Perhaps most perplexing of all to a
lawyer: if Panza’s fabrication of Judd’s works was indeed “contrary” to
an agreement, why didn’t Judd sue to enforce its terms rather than attack
Panza through hostile essays?
Adding to these mysteries was Judd’s decision, a year earlier, to take
out a paid advertisement in Art in America, a leading art publication,
renouncing authorship of an “installation wrongly attributed” to Judd at
1. DONALD JUDD, Una stanza per Panza (1990), in DONALD JUDD WRITINGS 630, 643 (Flavin
Judd & Caitlin Murray eds., 2016).
2. Id. at 631.
3. Id.
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the Ace Gallery in Los Angeles.4 “Fabrication of the piece,” the
advertisement read, “was authorized by Giuseppe Panza without the
approval or permission of Donald Judd.”5 Under what set of
circumstances would a living artist think it necessary to advertise that he
did not permit the creation of certain sculptures in his name?
As it happens, Judd, along with many other leading figures in post1960s American art, did execute agreements—often labeled Certificate or
Certificate of Authenticity—with Panza and other collectors.6 This Article
refers to those agreements and the documents that memorialized them as
“Permissive Certificates.”7 Such documents generally served a dual
function quite different from the traditional art warranties, or promises of
authenticity, from which they took their name. On the one hand, they
resembled plans or blueprints instructing the collector how to fabricate
and install the subject artwork. Indeed, at the time of Panza’s purchase,
many of these artworks had never been fabricated and only existed in the
form of such plans.8 On the other hand, these documents also purported
to authenticate or warrant the subject works as genuine, much like
traditional certificates of authenticity which are familiar to collectors of
high-value objects of any kind.9

4. See Advertisement, Donald Judd: Prints and Related Works, ART IN AMERICA, Mar. 1990, at
104, 128 (showing the advertisement that Judd took out to renounce authorship of works refabricated
by Panza in Judd’s name for an exhibit in Los Angeles).
5. Id.
6. See generally Martha Buskirk, Public Experience/Private Authority, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 469, 471–76 (2017) (describing the collecting practice of Panza with respect to leading United
States conceptual and minimalist artists).
7. In particular, by the term “Permissive Certificate” I mean: a document originated by an artist
that purports to authorize another (1) to fabricate or otherwise manifest one or more tangible elements
of an artwork pursuant to instructions contained in the document, and (2) prospectively certifies the
to-be-fabricated or manifested artwork as a genuine work by that artist. I intend to exclude from this
definition artworks or art practices that purport to create or define legal rights as a component of the
work itself. For instance, Donorcard (2005) by the artist Carey Young consists of a series of small
business-card-sized cards, resembling organ donor cards, signed by Young. Carey Young,
Donorcard, in IN DEED: CERTIFICATES OF AUTHENTICITY IN ART, 71, 71 (Susan Hapgood & Cornelia
Lauf, eds., 2011) [hereinafter In Deed Catalog] (showing Donorcard). The cards, given away to
viewers, read:
In consideration of the donation of this card to me by the Artist, I hereby agree that this object
will only become an artwork by her upon the inclusion of my signature, and that it will retain its
status as an artwork solely for the duration of the Artist’s life, or my life, whichever is the shorter.
This is followed by a countersignature block meant to be signed by the viewer. Young is captivatingly
using the language and conventions of law to create art. The cards are not, though, certifying the
authenticity of a separate work. Thus, they are not properly Permissive Certificates as I use the term.
8. Buskirk, Public Experience, supra note 6, at 471–76.
9. See infra Part II(A).
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, this nascent practice of creating, authorizing,
and prospectively authenticating artworks solely though legal documents
led to a near-immediate parade of disputes that continues to this day. The
Guggenheim Museum, for instance, purportedly “knew” that it was
attaining a “mare’s nest of problems” when it acquired hundreds of works
from the Panza collection in the 1990’s, including many unfabricated Judd
artworks memorialized only in certificates and diagrams.10 The extent of
these problems eventually forced it to create its “Panza Collection
Initiative.” Tasked with studying ethical, legal, and conservational
questions concerning conceptual and minimalist artworks, the initiative
has since received over $3 million in grant funding to reckon with art that
exists as much on paper as it does in object form.11
This multiyear research project recently culminated in a two-day
symposium, entitled Object Lessons, held at the Guggenheim in April
2019.12 In connection with that symposium, the museum controversially
announced that it had formally decided to “decommission[]” more than
ten contested Judd works in its collection, among others.13 This sui generis
category includes some works previously fabricated by Panza over Judd’s
objections, as well as Judd works which have only ever existed in paper
form.14 Moreover, the Guggenheim has stated its intention to never
unilaterally “realize” these decommissioned works nor display them as
10. Randy Kennedy, Tricky Business: Defining Authenticity, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/arts/design/guggenheim-project-confronts-conceptual-artsnature.html [https://perma.cc/Y8YK-RVT5].
11. Id.; see also Eileen Kinsella, The Guggenheim Gets $750,000 to Help Answer Knotty,
Existential Questions About the Nature of Conceptual Art, ARTNET NEWS: ARTWORLD (Aug. 29,
2018),
https://news.artnet.com/art-world/guggenheim-museum-gets-750k-mellon-grant-1339031
[https://perma.cc/HEH5-KEUM] (announcing an additional $750,000 in funding for the third phase
of this initiative).
12. See Object Lessons: The Panza Collection Initiative Symposium at the Solomon R.
Guggenheim Museum, Peter B. Lewis Theatre (Apr. 9–10, 2019) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Object Lessons Symposium].
13. See, e.g., Andy Bettaglia, ‘The Work of Art Begins to Wobble’: Guggenheim Museum Stares
Down Heady Questions about Minimal and Conceptual Art in Panza Collection, ARTNEWS (Apr. 9,
2019), http://www.artnews.com/2019/04/09/guggenheim-panza-collection-symposium/
[https://perma.cc/6A68-6L2M].
14. See Object Lessons Symposium, supra note 12, listing panel titled, Decommission: Rights,
Responsibility and the Status of the Work (Apr. 9–10, 2019). According to the policy discussed at the
conference, this category “refers to any work that—for reason of authenticity or condition—is deemed
to be non-viable, yet, being possessed of historical significance, is preserved in whole or part.” See
still shots of slide from Object Lessons Symposium slideshow, “Decommission” Text for SRGM
Collection Policy (Apr. 10, 2019) (on file with the author). The Guggenheim has stated its intention
never to unilaterally fabricate these decommissioned works, meaning that they might be forever lost
to the public as artworks. Id. (noting that “[i]n cases where the work is unrealized in any form, it will
remain unrealized”).
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artworks, meaning that they might be forever lost to the public as works
of art.15
While Judd’s anger over Panza’s alleged wrongful treatment and
fabrication of his works is surely the most prominent dispute concerning
certificate-based art, it is hardly the only example. Just last year, for
instance, a clash arose regarding a Sol LeWitt wall drawing.16 Like many
artworks in the Panza collection, LeWitt’s work was often memorialized
and transferred only in certificate and diagram form.17
The owner of one such wall drawing (#679) left it to the Menil
Collection in his will, along with the private home where the work had
been painted directly onto a large wall.18 The Menil, being an art museum,
understandably elected to sell the house but retain the work. It accordingly
took title to and accessioned the underlying certificates into its collection,
and then painted over the original wall drawing pursuant to LeWitt’s
recognized intention for transfer of his works.19
The successor owner of the residence, however, had different ideas and
later decided to “un-erase” and expose the original wall drawing by
having the added layer of sheetrock mud removed.20 The ensuing outcry
was so strong that a local art blogger was purportedly pressured by the
Menil Collection to issue a correction for even alluding to the original
(exposed) painted wall as “a LeWitt.”21 A successor owner of a Certificate
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Paula Newton, Disappeared Sol LeWitt Painting Slowly Reappears in Houston Home,
GLASSTIRE (Jan. 9, 2018, 12:30 PM), http://glasstire.com/2018/01/09/disappeared-sol-lewittpainting-slowly-reappears-in-houston-home/ [https://perma.cc/ZBB9-YA2G]; Dan Singer, How the
30-Ft.-Tall Ghost of a Sol LeWitt Drawing is Slowly Reappearing in Houston’s Museum District,
SWAMPLOT (Jan. 5, 2018), http://swamplot.com/how-the-30-ft-tall-ghost-of-a-sol-lewitt-drawing-isslowly-reappearing-in-houstons-museum-district/2018-01-05/ [https://perma.cc/N5MB-PS6D]; see
also Julia Halperin, One Texas Woman’s Paradoxical and Controversial Quest to Prove She
Rediscovered a Major Work of Conceptual Art, ARTNET NEWS: ART WORLD (Jan. 18, 2018),
https://news.artnet.com/art-world/sol-lewitt-drawing-menil-texas-1201514 [https://perma.cc/6EJAZGQ3].
17. LeWitt’s wall drawings are generally memorialized in the form of transferable certificates,
accompanied by an illustrated diagram, instructing an owner how to recreate the work anew each time
it is (re)installed. See generally Peter J. Karol, The Threat of Termination in a Dematerialized Art
Market, 64 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 187, 187–90 and apps. A and B (2017) [hereinafter Karol,
Termination] (describing same in detail).
18. Singer, supra note 16.
19. Id.
20. There is even a website for the “un-erasing” project itself. See Lynn Steen & Jonna Hitchcock,
Un-Erasing Sol Lewitt, http://unerasingsollewitt.com/index.html [https://perma.cc/3PDU-B6W3]
(last visited Aug. 17, 2019, 1:56 PM).
21. Paula Newton, UPDATE: Why “Unerasing” a Sol LeWitt is Impossible, GLASSTIRE (Jan. 11,
2018), http://glasstire.com/2018/01/11/update-why-unerasing-a-sol-lewitt-is-impossible/
[https://perma.cc/LTC8-3JNU].
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of Authenticity for a LeWitt wall-drawing, in other words, persuaded a
third-party commentator to retract her reference to LeWitt’s authorship of
the original painted mural despite the fact that no one disputes that he
created it. On what grounds? The certificate had since changed hands.22
This LeWitt conflict closely parallels a prior dispute involving the
British artist Damien Hirst.23 In 1988, as an early example of his “spot
painting” series, Hirst painted a series of bright, multi-colored spots
directly onto a wall in a London home.24 At the same time, he created a
handwritten “Certificate of Authenticity” for the work, known as
“Bombay Mix,” which specifically required that the piece “must be
painted out before it is re-made for anywhere else.”25 When the original
home owner sold the home and moved, Hirst allegedly painted a new
version of Bombay Mix on canvas for the original owner to take with him
pursuant to the instructions in the certificate.26 For whatever reason,
however, the original wall was never painted over and the new
homeowners, understanding its value, professionally removed and
remounted the section of wall in preparation for a later sale.27
Hirst’s attorneys sent a cease-and-desist letter to the new home owners,
demanding that they destroy the work and not refer to it as a Hirst
artwork.28 By all accounts, Hirst’s actions made the wall drawing
unsellable even though no one disputed that Hirst personally created the
original mural, or that the new homeowners legally possessed good title
to the piece of wall as part of their purchase of the home. As summed up
by the gallerist trying to sell the original Bombay Mix painted wall
surface, “I am essentially not allowed to say that I have a picture by the
artist that is actually by the artist.”29
Art historians, artists, cultural critics, economists, and philosophers of
art have spent decades unpacking and critiquing the aesthetic and
pecuniary paradoxes underlying these Permissive Certificates.30 This
22. Id.
23. See generally Ben Bryant & Robert Mendick, Spot of Bother over Damien Hirst Wall Art Painting, THE
TELEGRAPH (July 12, 2014, 10:45 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/art/10963754/Spot-of-botherover-Damien-Hirst-wall-art-painting.html [https://perma.cc/KP7P-UXZ9].
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. For a few of these perspectives, see MARTHA BUSKIRK, THE CONTINGENT OBJECT OF
CONTEMPORARY ART (2003); JOAN KEE, MODELS OF INTEGRITY: ART AND LAW IN POST-SIXTIES
AMERICA 43–64, 191–26 (2019) [hereinafter KEE, MODELS] (surveying the rise of contract and
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Article, by contrast, takes a narrower approach. It studies these documents
solely and simply as legal instruments, trying to understand them as focal
points of legal—as opposed to aesthetic—value.
Some readers may find this a tedious way of approaching stirring
original artworks. However, it is important to do so for two reasons. First,
this method shows that Permissive Certificates are not just documents of
art historical interest. They also function as highly complex (and equally
paradoxical) legal devices defining valuable legal rights. If the early
Permissive Certificates of conceptual art captured an “aesthetic of
linguistic conventions and legalistic arrangements,” as art historian
Benjamin Buchloh put it, then this Article intends to show that those latter
arrangements were, and still are, real ones.31
More specifically, the legal function of Permissive Certificates is
twofold. As their name suggests, they initially warrant that the named
artist created the conceptual content of the underlying work. In this regard,
they parallel traditional fine art certificates of authenticity, though with
important differences detailed below. Their other (underappreciated) legal
function, however, is not to promise retrospective authentication but
rather to grant prospective permissions. That is, they grant the owner of
the documents the right to realize an artwork and label it as a work by the
artist if the work remains materially unaltered from its original plan. As
such, they are essentially copyright licenses coupled with a right of source
association.
Critically, as with all copyright and source-based permissions,
Permissive Certificates are generally conditioned on the owner/licensee
complying with use guidelines. Material variations from such terms place
certificate-based artworks); Benjamin H.D. Buchloh, Conceptual Art 1962–1969: From the Aesthetic
of Administration to the Critique of Institutions, 55 THE MIT PRESS 105, 117–55 (1990) (surveying a
history of the Conceptual Art movement); Laura A. Heymann, Dialogues of Authenticity, 58 STUD.
L. POL. & SOC’Y 25 (2015) [hereinafter Heymann] (exploring questions of authorship and authenticity in the
context of certificate-based and other artworks); NICOLAS BOURRIAUD, RELATIONAL AESTHETICS (Simon
Pleasance & Fronza Woods, trans., 2002) (essays on the works of Gonzalez-Torres and others). For artist
statements on the subject, see for example, Sol LeWitt, Paragraphs on Conceptual Art, ARTFORUM (June
1967),
https://www.corner-college.com/udb/cproVozeFxParagraphs_on_Conceptual_Art._Sol_leWitt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LAZ6-PERW]; JUDD, supra note 1 (lamenting mistreatment of Judd’s certificate-based works
by collector Giuseppe Panza). For an aesthetic philosopher’s account of certificate-based and related art, see
K.E. GROVER, ART AND AUTHORITY 165–73 (2018). For market-based discussions, see, for example NOAH
HOROWITZ, ART OF THE DEAL: CONTEMPORARY ART IN A GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKET 87–42 (2014)
(describing market for what he calls “experiential art”); DON THOMPSON, THE $12 MILLION STUFFED SHARK:
THE CURIOUS ECONOMICS OF CONTEMPORARY ART 14–15 (2008) (commenting on pricing of works by
Gonzalez-Torres and others). Most of the certificates discussed in this article may be found in the catalog for a
seminal show on the subject, which contains a range of essays on certificates. See generally In Deed Catalog,
supra note 7.
31. Buchloh, supra note 30, at 131.
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the owner/licensee outside the scope of the license, or otherwise in breach
of its conditions, and, therefore, at risk of claims of infringement by the
artist.32
Second, this Article shows that Permissive Certificates harbor
unappreciated power to be an effective tool for artist control. This is
particularly salient in jurisdictions such as the United States where moral
rights—that is, the personal, noneconomic rights of an author to assert
control over works after they have been transferred—remain relatively
weak.33 Permissive Certificates could serve as something of a supermoral-right to artists inclined to use them in this way. To be clear, this
Article does not make a normative case for giving artists and their
representatives more control over sold works. Rather, it aims to show that
these certificates exist as a potent alternative source of legal rights for
artists and artist estates, for better or worse.
Part I chronologically surveys exemplary uses of Permissive
Certificates in conceptual, post-representational, and new-media art.34
The final section of this Part reveals and explains a central legal paradox
behind the foregoing certificates. Namely, that traditional certificates of
authenticity function retrospectively by making a factual claim about a
particular object that exists in history. Permissive Certificates, however,
purport to certify the authenticity of something not yet in existence,
prospectively.
Part II seeks to resolve this paradox by arguing that these documents
are not unitary instruments, but rather an amalgamation of two distinct
legal structures. In particular, they couple retrospective, if narrow,
warranties on the one hand with copyright licenses and prospective rights
of source authentication on the other. This Part begins by analyzing
traditional certificates of authenticity in fine art, showing how Permissive
Certificates still perform a typical authentication function—though only
in the limited sense that the artist is warranting creation of the underlying
content of the work and not a particular tangible object. It next provides
an overview of non-patent intellectual property licensing in the United
32. See infra Part II.
33. See infra Part III(A)(1) for a discussion of moral rights.
34. References to “conceptual, post-representational and new media art” are meant broadly to
encompass any artistic practice including reproducible components or that is in any degree recreated
anew for each realization or exhibition. I do not mean to refer to “conceptual art” in the limited sense
by which that (controversial) term might be understood as a specific and time-bracketed, art-historical
moment. My use of the term includes, for instance, artists like Josh Kline (whose work uses 3Dprintable components meant to be recreated each time the work is shown), video or digital artists,
classic conceptualists like Sol LeWitt, and post-representational contemporary artists such as Rikrit
Tiravanijia. Due to space constraints, the artists discussed throughout are simply representative
examples of the countless practitioners in these spaces. See infra Part I.
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States, including basic principles of contract formation and enforceability,
as well as quasi-licensing doctrines like the first-sale exceptions in
trademark and right of publicity law. Finally, this Part applies these
foregoing legal structures to two representative examples of actual
Permissive Certificates. It demonstrates how, under federal law, they are
structured as copyright licenses coupled with basic rights of source
association (arising primarily from first sale rights).
Part III explores the implications of the conclusions in Part II. It
approaches the question from two perspectives. First, it takes a practical
approach and shows how Permissive Certificates can function as a potent
tool for artists to exert legal control over works they sold long ago.
Second, it steps back and reflects more generally on what this might mean
for artists and collectors of art as we move into the middle of the twentyfirst century. It argues that museums and other collectors will increasingly
become repositories not of art objects but of legal instruments that grant
highly valuable, often exclusive, intangible rights to create and show
artworks. Over the long run, museums and other collectors of fine art will
become collectors—not of things, but of permissions.
I.

PERMISSIVE CERTIFICATES IN CONCEPTUAL, POSTREPRESENTATIONAL AND NEW MEDIA ART

By 2011, Permissive Certificates—certificates of authenticity
containing both instructional and authenticating components—had
become prolific enough to warrant their own traveling exhibition. A quick
flip through the catalog for the show, entitled In Deed: Certificates of
Authenticity in Contemporary Art, reveals the wide range of practices and
sheer number of different artists who have created art by use of certificates
over the last five or so decades.35
The genesis of this practice, however, came as much from the demands
of collectors as from the creativity of artists. Giuseppe Panza, in
particular, was focused on finding ways to memorialize his ownership of
conceptual works that he was increasingly acquiring in the late 1960s and
early 1970s solely in the form of paper permissions.36 As the art historian
Martha Buskirk describes, “the documents that appear in Panza’s files
were clearly instigated by the collector rather than by the artist—with
Panza wanting evidence of ownership not only for pieces purchased as
objects, but far more urgently, for a number acquired in the form of plans

35. See generally In Deed Catalog, supra note 7.
36. Buskirk, Public Experience, supra note 6, at 472.
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for future works.”37 Indeed, Judd himself was, at best, ambivalent about
his early certificate practices, and arguably adopted the form at the behest
of Panza.38
Judd essentially confirms this in his Una Stanza essay, where he
laments that his early certificates were the creation of Panza in
collaboration with Judd’s former gallerist, the legendary Leo Castelli, and
lawyers that did not represent Judd’s interests.39 Be that as it may, Judd’s
certificates still form paradigmatic examples of how early American
conceptual and minimalist artists created and sold works in the form of
paper permissions.40

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. JUDD, supra note 1, at 655. For instance, “[i]t’s important to say that all arrangements with
Panza were made by Castelli and . . . his lawyer, not mine.” Id.
40. This practice should be distinguished at the outset from two similar modes of art creation, the
outsourcing of fabrication by sculptors and the commissioning of works through the use of contracts.
It has, of course, long been a common practice of sculptors to have professional foundries create casts
of works under their oversight or with their authorization using molds created by the artist. See, e.g.,
Sharon Hecker, The Afterlife of Sculptures: Posthumous Casts and the Case of Medardo Rosso (1858–
1928), 16 J. ART HISTORIOGRAPHY 1 (June 2017) (same). That practice, however, assumes oversight
and involvement by the artist, and often is anchored by a physical mold created by the artist. Id. This
is different from Permissive Certificates which in their purest form can involve the transfer of
documentation without any associated objects and, at times, without even continuing oversight by the
artist. Similarly, the common practice of creating works on commission will often involve a contract
between artist and buyer. See, e.g., Serra v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045, 1047 (2d Cir.
1988) (describing contract between Richard Serra and the U.S. Government in the famous Titled Arc
dispute). In such cases, the artist is generally directly involved in creation and initial delivery of a
physical art object, though disputes often arise thereafter. Id.
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FIGURE 1

41

Figures 1 and 2, First Page for Certificate and Later Installation Shot for Donald Judd,
Untitled [seven plywood boxes] (1972–1973).

41. © 2019 Judd Foundation / Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York; Photo: © Walter Klein,
Düsseldorf. Used with Permission.
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Early Permissive Certificates (1960s and 1970s)

In the 1970s, in an early example of conceptual certification practice,
Judd issued Panza a three-page certificate for a work that had not yet been
“constructed or realized,” known as, Untitled [Seven plywood boxes: open
back].42 The document, now part of the Guggenheim’s Panza collection,
is simply entitled, “Certificate.” It “confirm[s]” Panza as the “sole and
exclusive owner” of the “work of art described” on the document, and
further that Judd personally “sold and/or transferred” the work. It thereby
serves a basic authentication function by confirming a provenance directly
from the named artist.43
As one reads on, the certificate morphs from a form of warranty into an
instrument of instruction and control. First, the document offers a handdrawn sketch plan of the work yet to be realized.44 In technical legal
language, it then effectively authorizes Panza (or his successors) “the right
to have the work constructed or realized, provided that this is done by
reference to and in strict and exact compliance with the Document and all
of the details and instructions set forth therein and provided further [that
Judd is notified accordingly].”45 This language is prototypical of an
intellectual property license.46 The author/owner of an intangible legal
interest (Judd) is permitting an authorized party (Panza) to use that legal
interest. The right is then made expressly subject to various limitations.
The legal function being performed by the document has strayed far from
the realm of retrospective authentication and entered that of prospective
permission and post-sale control.47
42. According to documents in the Panza Collection Initiative, although the date of the artwork is
indicated as 1972–1973 on first page of the certificate, the certificate was itself executed in 1975, at
the behest of Panza. See Object Lessons Symposium Screenshots, supra note 12 (showing 1975
execution date on final page of document).
43. Donald Judd, Certificate for Untitled [Seven plywood boxes: open back], GUGGENHEIM
MUSEUM
(1972–1973)
[hereinafter
Judd
Certificate],
available
at
https://www.guggenheim.org/conservation/the-panza-collection-initiative/donald-judd
[https://perma.cc/DM7G-K3UQ]. This work is one of the nine Judd works fabricated by Panza that
the Guggenheim recently classified as “decommissioned” because of Judd’s objections to its
purportedly shoddy and unauthorized realization. See Bettaglia, supra note 13.
44. The document further cross-references other “construction information” in the possession of
Peter Ballantine, a longtime fabricator of Judd’s works. Judd Certificate, supra note 43.
45. Id. “Document” is a defined term and includes the extrinsic construction information in
Ballantine’s possession, referenced above.
46. See infra Part II(B).
47. In later writings, Judd excoriated Panza for unilaterally recreating and installing the subject
works without Judd’s involvement. See JUDD, supra note 1, at 646–47 (“Panza ignored instructions
over and over and made my work himself. He never asked about an installation; he just did it. Is it
interesting now, or in a century, to see Panza’s construction of my work or his version of its
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Many other artists working in conceptual and performance-based
practices throughout the 1970s were active users of certificates, generally
tasking them to serve dual roles as a form of authentication and guide for
installation. LeWitt’s well-known form of certificate for his wall drawings
described and illustrated parameters of the work that LeWitt intended for
the purchaser to recreate on a wall of the purchaser’s choosing.48 Dan
Flavin used certificates in much the same fashion to both authenticate and
inform a purchaser how to recreate his neon light installations.49 Gordon
Matta Clark, best known for his dramatic and performative “cuts” of
actual buildings, created a “Certificate of Authenticity and Ownership”
for a planned cut of his home in 1976.50 That document first “certifies” (in
the present tense) “the work described here” as “authentic.” But it goes on
to detail the planned work in the future tense (“the artist home to be cut
into two-foot sections”) and makes clear that the certificate was created
“before the completed project date.”51
Unlike Judd’s certificate for Panza, neither LeWitt’s, Flavin’s, nor
Matta Clark’s certificates make express contractual demands on their
owners concerning fabrication or performance of the work. Nevertheless,
they generally mandate, in some combination, that the certifying
document (i) shall itself not be considered the artwork, (ii) may not be
reproduced, and/or (iii) must accompany the work if transferred.52
B.

Later Permissive Certificates (1980s and 1990s)

By the late 1980s, these early forays into memorializing art on paper
by Judd, LeWitt, Matta Clark, Flavin and others crystallized into
installation? It’s better that the work doesn’t exist than be wrong. It’s not made to be wrong.”).
48. See generally Karol, supra note 17, at 187–90 & apps. A and B.
49. Dan Flavin, certificate for Untitled (1970), in In Deed Catalog, supra note 7. Although Flavin’s
certificates are particularly sparse, even he makes gestures at artistic control by noting: “This is a
certificate only. It is not a drawing of mine.” Id. According to Joan Kee, Flavin actually employed a
two-step process whereby he would “partly certify” the work upon purchase of the instructions, and
then later “‘completely’ certify it upon . . . execution.” KEE, MODELS, supra note 30, at 204.
50. Gordon Matta-Clark, Certificate of Authenticity and Ownership (1976), in In Deed Catalog,
supra note 7, at 37. For a general discussion of Matta Clark’s “cuts” as well as his other law-infused
works, see KEE, MODELS supra note 30, at 103–28.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. See, e.g., Karol, supra note 17, app. B (“This certification is the signature for the wall drawing
and must accompany the wall drawing if it is sold or otherwise transferred.”); id. (“This is a
diagram . . . but is not a certificate or a drawing.”); Flavin, supra note 49, at 20 (“This is a certificate
only. It is not a drawing of mine.”); Matta-Clark, supra note 50, at 37 (“This document . . . shall at no
time be reproduced as a work . . . . [A]ny work . . . shall be considered fake and of no commercial
value unless accompanied by this signed document . . . . No duplicates or replacements of this
document will be made at any time.”).
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certifying instruments that purport to control as much as they authenticate
and instruct. Felix Gonzalez-Torres, for example, began creating multipage, legalistic certificates of authenticity for his ephemeral candy spills,
paper stacks and other works.53 He continued this practice throughout the
early nineties until his tragically early death in 1996, after which point his
estate and The Felix Gonzalez-Torres Foundation took over issuing (and
reissuing) them for works created during his lifetime.54
Figure 355

Felix Gonzalez-Torres, “Untitled” 1989/1990, Print on paper, endless copies, 26 in. at
ideal height x 29 x 56 in. overall (Original paper size: 29 x 23 inches).

Take Gonzalez-Torres’s “Untitled” 1989/1990, a work consisting of
“endless copies” of two of stacks of printed paper, each about twenty-six
inches high.56 The work consists of two stacks of paper printed anew for
each exhibition. The text on one stack reads, “[s]omewhere better than

53. See generally KEE, MODELS, supra note 30, at 191–226.
54. See Joan Kee, Felix Gonzalez-Torres on Contracts, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 517, 518
(2017) [hereinafter Kee, Felix Gonzalez-Torres]. As Kee explains, Gonzalez-Torres’s own certificateissuing practices evolved over time with later certificates being issued by his estate after his death.
According to Kee, Gonzalez-Torres never consulted an attorney in preparing the documents, though
his foundation now does. KEE, MODELS, supra note 30, at 203–04.
55. © Felix Gonzalez-Torres. Courtesy of The Felix Gonzalez-Torres Foundation.
56. The complete certificate to “Untitled” 1989/1990, may be found at 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y app. A at 1–6 (2017) [hereinafter “Untitled” 1989/1990 Certificate].
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this place.”57 The other, “[n]owhere better than this place.”58 In 2002,
Gonzalez-Torres’s estate and gallery posthumously issued the works
accompanying “Certificate of Authenticity and Ownership” to a buyer
that countersigned it.59 The certificate expressly grants the new owner the
“right to reprint sheets from the stacks at any time for the purposes of
recreating or regenerating the stacks.”60
The intention of the piece—and the reason why reprinting is so
essential to its actualization—is that “third parties may take individual
sheets from the stacks.”61 In other words, viewers are invited to take away
individual sheets from each installation of the work, thus creating a
participatory and interactive element of the work.62
Even more so than the Judd certificate, the six single-spaced pages of
the ownership document consist of language designed to simultaneously
guide and limit the owner’s use and resale of the work. The terms range
from technical suggestions (a recommended typeface and font size for the
text) to dense and strict restrictions on resale (including, most
prominently, a right of first refusal on behalf of the Andrea Rosen Gallery
and Felix Gonzalez-Torres Foundation).63 The document goes so far as to
purport to restrict non-parties’ rights in the take-away copies by asserting
that “no one owning a single sheet taken away at an exhibition has the
right to reprint, publish or otherwise commercially use the sheet[].”64
The primary purpose of issuing these certificates was “to reassure
owners who found it difficult to see how an idea could be a unique work
of art.”65 That is, buyers of conceptual works demanded something
tangible that could serve as the locus of value for the piece.66 Just as Panza,
the early conceptual collector, pushed artists to create certificates in part
57. Id. at 1.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2.
62. To that end, this author took away a pair of sheets from an installation of “Untitled” 1989/1990
Certificate in Miami, which remain in his office.
63. Id. at 1.
64. Id. It is difficult to imagine how such a quasi-contractual restriction could be enforced against
a visitor that has taken away a sheet of paper, as the certificate is never shown to, let alone signed by,
the museum-going public. In fact, the Felix Gonzalez-Torres Foundation refused to allow a certificate
to be included in the In Deed show, effectively blocking the public from being aware of its terms. The
Felix Gonzalez-Torres Foundation, correspondence from 2010 in In Deed Catalog, supra note 7, at
25 (reprinting email of denial).
65. Kee, Felix Gonzalez-Torres, supra note 54, at 522–23.
66. See generally Buskirk, Public Experience, supra note 6 at 471-73.
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to assure Panza of his ownership rights, buyers of Gonzalez-Torres works
required documentation of their purchases.67
Despite (or perhaps because of) these restrictions, the right to exhibit
and reproduce two different Gonzalez-Torres paper stacks (in the form of
these certificates) have sold at auction for $770,50068 and $1.65 million,69
respectively, with his equally dematerialized candy spill works having
sold for almost ten times that amount.70
C.

Permissive Certificates After 2000

Permissive Certificates with express artist control provisions have all
but become an industry custom for artworks with a conceptual or
reproducible component. Most commonly, they are associated with the
now-common acquisition of video and other “time-based” artworks that
have long been understood to require copyright permissions, in addition
to possession of the content itself, to be publicly displayed.71 Their reach,
however, is far broader than time-based works, extending to many
different media and practices.
To take one representative example, Cerith Wyn Evans’s With the
Advent of Radio Astronomy . . . (Clear), created in 2010, consists of a
paragraph of text (seventy-three words long) written by the artist.72 Like
many works of text art, the words are printed in glossy vinyl and affixed
to a wall with an adhesive.73 There are no prescribed dimensions for the

67. Id. at 472 (“[T]he documents that appear in Panza’s files were clearly instigated by the collector
rather than by the artist—with Panza wanting evidence of ownership not only for pieces purchased as
objects, but far more urgently, for a number acquired in the form of plans for future works.”).
68. See Auction results listing for Felix Gonzalez-Torres: “Untitled” (Blue Mirror) , SOTHEBY’S:
CONTEMPORARY ART DAY AUCTION 463 (Nov. 14, 2012, 9:30 AM), http://www.sothebys.com/en/auctions/
ecatalogue/2012/contemporary-art-day-auction-n08901/lot.463.html [https://perma.cc/SXV4-WSG7].
69. See Auction results listing for Felix Gonzalez-Torres: “Untitled” (Aparición), SOTHEBY’S:
CONTEMPORARY ART EVENING SALE 3 (May 11, 2011, 7:00 PM) http://www.sothebys.com/en/auctions
/ecatalogue/2011/contemporary-i-n08744/lot.3.html [https://perma.cc/5FUV-BHMU].
70. See Karol, supra note 17, at 200. The concept of “dematerialization” in art was introduced in a
canonical essay on conceptual art coauthored by Lucy R. Lippard and John Chandler. See Lucy R.
Lippard and John Chandler, The Dematerialization of Art, ART INT’L 12.2, at 31–36 (Feb. 1968)
(observing that “a trend appears to be provoking a profound dematerialization of art, especially of art
as object, and if it continues to prevail, it may result in the object’s becoming wholly obsolete”).
71. Karol, supra note 17, at 200–02 (describing conventions concerning licenses for time-based works).
72. See Online Listing for Cerith Wyn Evans: With the Advent of Radio Astronomy, WHITE CUBE
(Jan. 22, 2018) [hereinafter WHITE CUBE Online Listing], http://whitecube.com/shop
/editions/cerith_wyn_evans_with_the_advent_of_radio_astronomy_grey/ [https://perma.cc/4MN3-BL3Z].
73. Id.
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piece; however, one exhibited version was about one-half meter by oneand-one-half meters as mounted.74
A collector wishing to purchase an edition of With the Advent of Radio
Astronomy from Evans’s gallerist, White Cube in London, could attain the
piece directly through an online shopping basket from the galley’s website
for just over £1,000.75 What exactly, though, is the collector attaining for
that price? The entire paragraph of text constituting the work is provided
on the public website, meaning there is nothing secret about the words
themselves. The purchaser receives a CD containing a digital image of the
text, as well as “installation instructions,” however it is difficult to
imagine someone who could not figure out how to print and mount the
text on a wall themselves by just looking at the installation shot on the
gallery’s website.76
The true value to the collector of this otherwise easily reproducible
work, of course, is the “Certificate of Authenticity” which accompanies
the piece.77 That document is a quintessential example of Permissive
Certificates in contemporary practice. It satisfies the collector’s desire for
genuineness in that it clearly and expressly “certifies the authenticity of
the above work” and is signed and dated by the artist himself.78 In that
regard, it mimics traditional fine art warranties of genuineness.79
Yet, as with most of the preceding examples, the lion’s share of the
instrument consists of limiting language that circumscribes the
purchaser’s rights and serves a double function as instructions:
Requirements for reproduction:
Polymeric high-performance vinyl 9899–90, Clear,
thickness 66 microns.
No minimum or maximum dimensions apply.
Only to be reproduced using the pdf file supplied at the
time of purchase.
Only one copy of the artwork should be displayed by a
single owner at any given time.

74. Id. The work is one edition of twenty-five. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Cerith Wyn Evans, Certificate, With the advent of Radio Astronomy in In Deed Catalog, supra
note 7, at 71 [hereinafter Evans Certificate].
78. Id.
79. See infra Part II(A).
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Apart from the scale of the text, there must be no other
modifications to the design, which must remain as
specified.80
In no uncertain terms, the document then goes on to connect its
certification function to its control function: “Any reproduction of the
above work is only guaranteed to be an authentic work of art by Cerith
Wyn Evans when all reproductions requirements listed above have been
met and accompanied by this certificate.”81 Finally, the certificate reserves
all intellectual property rights in the artist.82
D.

The Paradox of Permissive Certificates

The Evans Certificate reveals in particularly stark terms the central
paradox behind every one of the Permissive Certificates described above.
Namely, in the same document through which Evans gave a present,
unconditional warranty of genuineness, he conditioned future
endorsements of the same work on the owner fulfilling certain
requirements prospectively.
In essence, these legal instruments are simultaneously making the
following two statements:
(i) I presently certify that the existing thing described in this
document, A, is an artwork by me that is owned by you; and
(ii) I will in the future certify that the thing to be created pursuant
to this document, A, is an artwork by me that is owned by you if
and only if my rules for A are followed.83
There is, to be sure, no inherent logical inconsistency in these
statements. The two claims are being made with respect to different points
in time, one present and the other future. One can approve of an activity
now but disapprove of the way it is being conducted later.
The difficulty, though, is that these sorts of highly conditional
guarantees go against the very essence of traditional fine art warranties.
Warranties, traditionally conceived, certify that an already existing thing
has a set of properties at the time of sale.84 For instance, in order to assure
a doubtful buyer, a dealer might warrant that a particular artist painted a
80. Evans Certificate, supra note 77, at 71 (emphasis in original). The certificate elsewhere
specifies, among other things, that it is not itself “a work of art and must not be displayed as such”
and that it “will . . . not be reissued if lost.” Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See infra Part II(A).
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particular work.85 These promises concern actual objects, created at some
point in time prior to the issuance of the warranty. The fight is over the
accuracy of a set of historic facts concerning their origin.
By contrast, Permissive Certificates purport to warrant authorship of
objects to be created and/or events to be performed in the future. Although
in almost all cases, the subject “work” is spoken of in the past tense, as
having been created by the artist/author prior to the creation of the
instrument, the physical manifestations of that work are yet-to-berealized. This is fundamentally and deeply at tension with the
retrospective essence of traditional fine art warranties.
Using Evans’s case as an example, the buyer has purchased one of a
predetermined twenty-five editions of With the Advent of Radio
Astronomy. And the certificate repeatedly references the work in the past
tense, as a thing already in existence. The language and structure of the
document is thus far consistent with traditional certifications of fine art as
authentic as of the time of sale. But that is where any consistency with
traditional warranties ends.
Specifically, the physical manifestation of that edition of the work—
the adhesive vinyl wall text—has not yet been created by the buyer at the
time of sale. The buyer, after all, is expressly permitted to reproduce the
text for that edition as often as the buyer wishes from the digital file, so
long as there is never more than one copy displayed at any given time. So,
while the edition is one of twenty-five, that particular edition itself can be
recreated (by physically reprinting the vinyl letters) an infinite number of
times. The edition is, really, one of an infinite number of possible physical
versions of the work, with each actualization calling for separate
authentication with each future printing.
Much the same can be said for higher-value single-edition works, like
those of Gonzalez-Torres. There is only ever one “Untitled” 1989/1990,
and it was created by Gonzalez-Torres while he was alive. That point is
made expressly in the certificate.86 It is intentionally a conceptual piece
that evolves over time but remains one “unique” work. To the extent that
the genesis of the content of that work predates the act of certification, it
is again consistent with traditional warranty practice.87 But the warranty
collapses prospectively. It is, in effect, purporting to certify the factual
85. See, e.g., Rogath v. Siebenmann, 129 F.3d 261, 26263 (2d Cir. 1997) (dispute over scope of
warranty contained in bill of sale for a Francis Bacon self-portrait of dubious authenticity).
86. See “Untitled” 1989/1990 Certificate, supra note 56, at 1 (specifying “‘Untitled’,
1989/1990 . . . is a unique work of art owned by [the named owners] . . . The physical manifestation
of this work in more than one place at a time does not impugn this works uniqueness since its
uniqueness is defined by its ownership, verified by” the certificate).
87. Id.

12 - Karol (3).docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

10/29/2019 4:08 PM

PERMISSIVE CERTIFICATES

1195

accuracy of a thing-to-be-created (two printed stacks of paper) in the
future.
To see this, just imagine a printing for a new exhibition that includes a
typo in one of the stacks. Perhaps the paper reads, “somewhere better then
this place.” This is clearly not the work. The error completely alters the
meaning of the sentence, rendering it a common homonym error that
would convey an entirely different message to a viewer.
But in order to make that determination (that is, in order to deauthenticate this iteration of the work) a current and new appraisal must
be made. This might involve looking to the earlier-created certificate, and
comparing its instructions to the current, erroneous stacks. The certificate
tells us it is real, and by Gonzalez-Torres, but only if the proper sentence
is used.88 This is a conditional verification and, as such, it requires
someone (gallerist Andrea Rosen, say, or the Gonzalez-Torres
Foundation, or some other person designated as an expert) to look at the
reprint to vouch for its accuracy or, in this case, expose its error. Critically,
however, this requires a new, present-day recertification of a now-historic
object (the stack printed for the current exhibition).
The paradox, then, is that artists are certifying that a work is genuine
but because the works are, by definition, reproducible, each and every
reproduction necessitates a new appraisal and recertification. In fact, to
the extent that the original certificate purports to be able to authenticate a
later iteration, it is making a misleading claim. It is impossible to swear to
the truth of a fact that has not yet happened. The later iteration, to serve a
valid warranty function, necessitates some later expert’s recertification.
One might be tempted, at this point, to simply chalk the paradox up to
the notoriously elusive nature of conceptual art. It is an entire aesthetic
premised on the slipperiness of the idea of a static “artwork,” and might
simply be too inherently subversive for traditional legal doctrines to
digest.89 But there is, in fact, a straightforward and well-developed legal
regime that can make sense of, and justify, this paradox of Permissive
Certificates.
II.

CERTIFICATES AS LICENSES

This Part argues that the apparent paradox of Permissive Certificates
results from their performance of a double function under a single name.
These instruments are an amalgam of two highly divergent legal
88. Id. (detailing precise language to be printed on the sheets).
89. Cf. Michael J. Madison, The End of the Work as We Know It, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 325, 328–
29, 350–52 (2012) (exposing misfit between the notion of the “work” in conceptual art and U.S.
copyright law).
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paradigms that have been pressed into service together in one document.
Once these two functions are disaggregated, the paradox evaporates.
On the one hand, as their name suggests, they serve a retrospective
authentication function as a warranty. This warranty, however, is
narrower than that typically used in fine art transactions. It is a guarantee
that the named artist created the aesthetic content of the work. This is
related to, but more limited than, the conventional fine art warranty that
assures a buyer that the named artist created (or supervised the creation
of) a specific and existent tangible object.
The secondary function of these certificates, however, is at once less
transparent and more meaningful to buyers of works with a conceptual or
otherwise reproducible component. Namely, they provide a conditional
set of permissions. Although these can vary from work to work, the
documents generally may be read to include at least the following core
permissions: (i) to make and display reproductions of the physical
manifestations of the work; (ii) to perform any acts necessary to realize
the piece; and (iii) to associate the artist’s name with the future realization
of the work and call it genuine.
Before discussing these permissions below, it is important to note at
the outset that they are conditional. Should a buyer/licensee of a work not
follow rules that are expressly or impliedly stated in the certifying
instrument, then the permissions may be withdrawn. In short, the
secondary function of Permissive Certificates is to provide forward
looking, but conditional, permissions to create something genuine and
associate it with a particular source. And that tracks the essential structure
of an intellectual property license.90
A.

Permissive Certificates as Narrow Warranties of Authorship

Broadly understood, a contractual warranty is simply “a seller’s
promise that the thing being sold is as represented or promised.”91 Thus,
90. For prior observations along these lines, see Eduardo M. Peñalver & Sergio Muñoz Sarmiento,
Law in the Work of Felix Gonzalez-Torres, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 449, 452–53 (2017)
(“[P]erhaps under certain circumstances, it is more appropriate to think of the collector of GonzalezTorres works as a mere licensee.”); Daniel McClean, Authenticity in Art and Law: A Question of
Attribution or Authorization? in In Deed Catalog, supra note 7, at 93 (describing certificates in
conceptual art as “authorizing the owner to fulfill the work”); Kee, MODELS, supra note 30, at 204
(calling Gonzalez-Torres certificates “hybrid license-contracts”); Kee, Felix Gonzalez-Torres, supra
note 54, at 518 (2017) (observing of Gonzalez-Torres’s early certificates that they “tended to resemble
a hybrid of a conventional certificate of authenticity and a set of instructions”). Buskirk also clearly
recognizes that these certificates have the power to form contractual bases for artists to control their
work. Buskirk, Public Experience, supra note 6, at 476.
91. Warranty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1821 (10th ed. 2014).
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art warranty disputes have long boiled down to case-specific inquiries
over what, exactly, the seller promised to the buyer especially with respect
to representations over who painted or otherwise created the work.92
Given the heavily fact-specific nature of these cases, it is dangerous to
generalize about authenticity claims.93 That said, key art market
jurisdictions such as New York have been at pains to lock down the
definitions, once and for all, of attributive language typically used in
certificates of authenticity.94
What, though, can these traditional fine art authenticity laws—created
with tangible objects in mind—teach us about the legal effect of a
forward-looking Permissive Certificate such as that used by LeWitt, Judd,
Evans or Gonzalez-Torres? Of particular interest for these purposes, New
York legislators were acutely aware of the problem of “multiples” in
crafting their legislation concerning certificates of authenticity.95
92. For instance, in a classic nineteenth century case, a jury interpreted a bill of sale containing the
language “Four pictures, Views in Venice, Canalleto” to be a warranty of genuineness that the artist
Canalleto painted the work, as opposed to a mere expression of opinion. Power v. Barham, 111 Eng.
Rep. 865, 865–66 (K.B. 1836) (upholding jury’s determination that bill of sale was a warranty). The
court affirmed this verdict, despite an earlier case having come out the opposite way for an analogous
attribution in a different catalog. Id. at 866; cf. Jendwine v. Slade, 170 Eng. Rep. 459, 459–60 (N.P.
1797) (simply putting the name of an artist opposite a picture in a catalog is a statement of opinion
and not a warranty).
93. Modern art warranty cases in the United States remain similarly fact-specific, with parties
regularly fighting over the meaning of contractual representations made by sellers. The disputes,
however, are typically now channeled through modern statutory frameworks such as the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) and various state law art market regulations. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-313(b)
(“Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.”); Christie’s Inc. v. SWCA, Inc., 867
N.Y.S.2d 650, 655–57 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (analyzing complicated set of letter agreements through
framework of New York Art and Cultural Affairs Law § 13.01). In the sculpture context, disputes can
concern later casts from an original authentic mold, or new casts made from earlier casts, known as
surmoulage. See Hecker, supra note 40, at 4 (defining surmoulage and related notions); Christie’s
Inc., 867 N.Y.S.2d at 653 (whether a description of a Picasso sculpture as genuine and not surmoulage
had a reasonable basis in fact was a factual dispute preventing summary judgment over liability for
rescinded sale).
94. See generally N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 13.01 (McKinney 2018). After first tracking the
U.C.C. in clarifying generally that “material facts” stated in a certificate of authenticity operate as an
“express warranty.” Id. at § 13.01(1)(b). The New York law goes on to list common attributive
language in certificates, and defines the legal meaning of those terms:
(a) The work is by a named author or has a named authorship, without any limiting words, means
unequivocally, that the work is by such named author or has such named authorship;
(b) The work is “attributed to a named author” means a work of the period of the author,
attributed to him, but not with certainty by him; or
(c) The work is of the “school of a named author” means a work of the period of the author, by
a pupil or close follower of the author, but not by the author.
Id. at § 13.01(3).
95. Id. at § 11.01(21). Multiples, under the statutory definition, are “prints, photographs, positive
or negative, sculpture and similar art objects produced in more than one copy” that sell for over a
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Although the definition of “multiples” does not expressly encompass
creations as difficult to define as text art and Felix Gonzalez-Torres paper
stacks, the final catch-all clause (“similar art objects”) seems broad
enough safely to cover almost all works existing in more than one copy
so long as they have at least some tangible (“object”) component.
What is beyond dispute is that the drafters clearly meant for statements
of authorship in certificates of authenticity to apply with equal force to
originals as to multiple-editioned works.96 Critically, where a certificate
of authenticity of any type—multiple or original—states that a “work is
by a named author or has a named authorship,” this “means[,]
unequivocally, that the work is by such named author or has such named
authorship.”97 Elsewhere the statute equates being both an artist and an
author of a multiple with being the person who is the “creator” of that
work.98
Putting all this together, it is fair to conclude that the New York statute
(perhaps one of the most specific of its type in defining the meaning of
certificates of authenticity) mandates that where Permissive Certificates
name an author, that author must have “created” the underlying work.99
The initial authentication function of certificates thus assures buyers that
the artist identified in the certificate created the aesthetic content of the
work.
B.

Permissive Certificates as Licenses

The limited retrospective warranty of content creation, however,
cannot be all that a buyer of a conceptual work is attaining. As discussed
at length above, the owner of Evans’s With the Advent of Radio Astronomy
baseline price. Id.
96. Id. at § 11.01(6) (“‘Certificate of authenticity’ means a written statement by an art merchant
confirming, approving or attesting to the authorship of a work of fine art or multiple, which is capable
of being used to the advantage or disadvantage of some person.”) (emphasis added)). The definition
of “[c]ertificate of authenticity” expressly covers “multiples,” as do both the definitions of “artist”
and “author.” Id. at §§ 11.01(1), (3). Section 13.05, moreover, generally applies the main warranty
provisions (section 13.01) to multiples. Id. at §§ 13.01, 13.05.
97. Id. at § 13.01(3)(a).
98. Id. § 11.01(1), (3). The definition of “[a]rtist” further adds that an artist of a multiple is the
person who “conceived or created the image” underlying the work. Id. § 11.01(1).
99. I do not mean to suggest that the New York legislature or judges interpreting these statutes are
the final arbiters of what is or is not an authentic artwork. As Professor Laura Heymann reminds us
in an extended discussion of authenticity, “the law’s pronouncements regarding authenticity can only
carry so much weight.” Heymann, Dialogues, supra note 23, at 48–49. There are many instances
where judges have concluded that a work is or is not authentic through legal processes, only to find
that the market rejected that conclusion. Id. For these purposes, I am only referring to legal (and not
market-based) means of authentication.
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expects to print anew and exhibit on a wall a paragraph of adhesive vinyl
text, and the owner of Gonzalez-Torres’s “Untitled” 1989/1990 expects
to reprint and allow visitors to take away sheets from two stacks of
paper.100 Giuseppe Panza, for instance, the original purchaser of Judd’s
Untitled [Seven plywood boxes: open back] fabricated the sculpture
described in the certificate after he attained it, with little to no supervision
by Judd and, indeed, over the artist’s objections.101
This section shows how the essentially prospective function of a
Permissive Certificate defines it as, in large part, a non-patent intellectual
property license. First, it briefly explains the operation of copyright
licenses, showing how they are structured to grant reproduction rights of
the sort central to an owner’s realization of conceptual, postrepresentational and new media works. Second, it explains the
relationship between authentication and labeling—that is, why the owner
of a genuine article generally has the right to truthfully reveal and
advertise its source. Finally, using two of the examples described above,
it predicts that U.S. courts would likely interpret these documents to create
a contractually enforceable copyright license coupled with proof of
authenticity sufficient to justify use of the artist’s name in connection with
exhibiting and reselling the work.
1.

The Basic Structure of Intellectual Property Licenses

a.

Affirmative Licenses

At its core, a license is “a permission . . . to commit some act that
would otherwise be unlawful.”102 A license primarily operates in a
negative capacity, preventing the property owner from enforcing a legal
right it would otherwise have. In the intellectual property context, “the
licensee is engaging in acts which would infringe . . . but for the
permission granted in the license.”103
100. See supra Part I(B).
101. See The Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, Donald Judd, GUGGENHEIM,
https://www.guggenheim.org/conservation/the-panza-collection-initiative/donald-judd
[https://perma.cc/DM7G-K3UQ]. For Judd’s general opposition to Panza’s unsupervised installations
of his works, see JUDD, supra note 1; KEE, MODELS, supra note 30, at 201.
102. License, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1059 (10th ed. 2014). As one court summarized it in a
copyright case, “The word ‘license,’ means permission, or authority; and a license to do any particular
thing, is a permission or authority to do that thing.” Ticketmaster LLC v. RMG Techs., Inc., 507 F.
Supp. 2d 1096, 1106 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (quoting Fed. Land Bank of Wichita v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs,
368 U.S. 146, 154 n.23 (1961)).
103. 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:79,
at 18-213 (5th ed. 2019).
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Not surprisingly, then, trademark, copyright, and right of publicity
licenses are simply permissions to use the grantor’s copyrighted work, 104
trademark,105 and publicity rights,106 respectively.107 Courts will generally
recognize such licenses so long as the alleged licensor owns an
identifiable trademark, copyright, or publicity interest, and a signed,
written instrument before the court can be read to grant permission to use
that interest “with reasonable clarity.”108
This assumes that the licensed interest is valid. Under the doctrine of
copyright misuse, for instance, a copyright license may not be extended
to protect otherwise uncopyrightable ideas.109 This raises some concerns
with respect to artworks with conceptual content, as a substantial body of
scholarship questions the copyrightability of fundamentally conceptual
works.110 Professor Amy Cohen, for instance, focuses on the
104. 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 5:118, at 5-279 (2019).
105. Bunn-O-Matic Corp. v. Bunn Coffee Serv., Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 914, 920–21 (C.D. Ill. 2000).
106. 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 10:15, at 475 (2d ed.
2019).
107. U.S. moral rights under Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) cannot be “transferred,” however
they may be waived if done so in writing. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) (2012). A waiver, which essentially
“permit[s] the author to hold harmless activity that in the absence of a waiver would violate VARA,”
operates much like the licenses discussed above. 5 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT
§ 16:37, at 16-77 (2019).
108. Weinstein Co. v. Smokewood Entm’t Grp., LLC, 664 F. Supp. 2d 332, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(quoting Rico Records Distribs., Inc. v. Ithier, No. 04 Civ. 9782(JSR), 2006 WL 846488, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2006)). As one court famously noted with respect to the minimal requirements
for a statutory, exclusive copyright license, “It doesn’t have to be the Magna Charta; a one-line pro
forma statement will do.” Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1990); see, e.g.,
Ticketmaster LLC v. RMG Techs., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (identifying
license in boilerplate website terms of use agreement that authorized limited copying for personal
use); Rico Records, 2006 WL 846488, at *1 (denying summary judgment where language on checks
could amount to exclusive copyright licenses or transfers). A copyright license agreement, moreover,
may omit the terms “copyright” or “exclusive rights.” Papa’s-June Music, Inc. v. McLean, 921 F.
Supp. 1154, 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). As the focus of this article is on written certificates of authenticity,
it will assume for these purposes that there is a written instrument that a court can interpret. That said,
a non-exclusive copyright license does not even need to be in writing, as it is not considered a transfer
of copyright ownership. Keane Dealer Servs., Inc. v. Harts, 968 F. Supp. 944, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(citing I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 775 (7th Cir. 1996)). Whether a court will imply a nonexclusive copyright license is a heavily fact-dependent question that may include consideration of
whether the artist/copyright owner transferred an object (such as an artwork) embodying the
copyright. See, e.g., Corbello v. DeVito, 777 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2015) (reversing grant of
summary judgment due to existence of “contradictory facts” concerning licensor intent). In Teter v.
Glass Onion, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1148–49 (W.D. Mo. 2010), for instance, the court found
that a visual artist granted an implied license to a gallery allowing the gallery to post images to its
website for purposes of reselling the artist’s work.
109. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 (4th Cir. 1990).
110. See generally Megan Carpenter & Steven Hetcher, Function over Form: Bringing the Fixation
Requirement into the Modern Era, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2221 (2014); Glen Cheng, The Aesthetics of
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idea/expression dichotomy, worrying that its stringent application to
conceptual artworks will cause judges to refuse to recognize copyright
protections for art lacking “permanent form” thereby making an
impermissible artistic value judgment based on outmoded, classical
conceptions of art.111
Professor Zahr Said has argued on alternative grounds that “copyright
illogically excludes conceptual art from protection on the basis of
fixation . . . .”112 In other words, the copyright rule excludes from
coverage any work which is not “sufficiently permanent or stable to
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a
period of more than transitory duration.”113 Professors Megan Carpenter
and Steven Hetcher similarly apply a sort of equal treatment principal for
art creation in concluding that fixation doctrine should drop its “transitory
duration” exclusion in order to avoid “discriminating against important
strains of contemporary art.”114
These concerns may be justified for some substantially ideational,
transitory or formless works.115 Professor Said, for instance, argues that
Copyright Adjudication, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 113, 127 (2012); Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and
the Myth of Objectivity: The Idea-Expression Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value
Judgments, 66 IND. L.J. 175, 208, 231–32 (1990); Charles Cronin, Dead on the Vine: Living and
Conceptual Art and Vara, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 209, 252 (2010); Joan Infarinato, Note,
Copyright Protection for Short-Lived Works of Art, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 90, 91–92 (1982) (arguing
a few years after the Copyright Act went into effect that courts should interpret the fixation and other
requirements to support copyrightability of “short-lived” environmental and site-specific artworks
such as Christo’s “Running Fence”); Madison, The End of the Work, supra note 89, at 350–52
(critiquing judicial approaches to “dynamic” artworks); Donald M. Millinger, Copyright and the Fine
Artist, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 354, 359 (1980) (“Conceptual artists, for whom art is the process of
creation and for whom the finished product, being merely ancillary, is usually temporary would not
meet the fixation requirement.”); Lori Petruzzelli, Comment, Copyright Problems in Post-Modern
Art, 5 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 115, 123 (1995); Zahr K. Said, Copyright’s Illogical Exclusion
of Conceptual Art, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 335 (2016).
111. Cohen, supra note 107, at 208, 231–32. Working in a more anti-protectionist vein, Lori
Petruzzelli describes a 1976 Chris Burden performance piece wherein he served espresso drinks to
gallery patrons and later sold the cream pitcher relic for $24,000. Petruzzelli focuses not on any
fixation problems with the performance but rather suggests that in such pieces the idea is effectively
merged with the expression. This leads her to the “ridiculous” result that if granted a copyright Burden
may be able to stop others from serving coffee or even threaten coffee pitcher makers with an
infringement action. She concludes that “the Copyright Act should not be changed to accommodate
the specific problems posed by post-modern art.” Petruzzelli, supra note 110, at 115, 123.
112. Said, supra note 110, at 337.
113. Id. at 338 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (definition of “fixed”)).
114. Carpenter & Hetcher, supra note 110, at 2227.
115. As an example of a substantially ideational work, take for instance Pierre Bismuth’s
Certificate of Authenticity—Ed Ruscha from 2000. In Deed Catalog, supra note 7, at 6. The certificate,
signed not by Bismuth but by the conceptual artist Ed Ruscha, consists entirely of a typed sentence
stating, “This is to certify that this is not an original work by Ed Ruscha.” It is an arresting piece,
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certain recent fixation holdings would likely deny copyright protection to
a Gonzalez-Torres candy spill due to its “inherently changing” nature.116
Said nevertheless advocates for an alternative reading of earlier fixation
precedent that she hopes sympathetic courts might use in order to save
Untitled (Portrait of Ross in L.A.) from losing copyright protection. In
Professor Said’s view, “[t]hat the viewer’s input has a limited, and
predictable, impact on the work constrains the range of possible different
versions of the work, and renders it effectively fixed.”117
This work faces serious copyrightability problems, but arguably for
different reasons. Both Said and a reversed lower court opinion she cites
fail to discuss a more serious fixation challenge than the fact that the work
depletes as visitors take candy away. The bigger problem is that the piece
has no prescribed form even when first installed in its ideal weight. The
dimensions of Gonzalez-Torres’s candy piles are generally left
“variable”—meaning that one can place the candy in the shape of a cube
or flat rectangle, or, as is more typical, pile the pieces in a corner.118 Thus,
there is no predictable range of possible shapes for a candy spill work—
and quite intentionally so, from Gonzalez-Torres’s perspective.
Critically for copyrightability purposes, however, this shapelessness
does not extend to his paper stack pieces, which are far more fixed in their
physical instantiations. Indeed, as demonstrated by my analysis of two
representative Permissive Certificates below, including the GonzalezTorres stack work, many, if not most, works with some reproducible or
conceptual content still contain tightly controlled formal elements that
allow the pieces to remain copyrightable.119
challenging us to consider how we “treat the value of signature and the hand versus the overarching
idea” as Professors Susan Hapgood and Cornelia Leaf express it. Id. at 84. But purely as a “concept”
it is almost certainly not copyrightable. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
116. Said, supra note 110, at 348 (referencing Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d
870, 874 (3d Cir. 1982)).
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., “Untitled” 1989/1990 Certificate, supra note 56, at 1 (noting, “[e]ach manifestation
may physically differ slightly” according to the owner’s ongoing right to interpret the “open-ended
yet specific parameters” of the work). The latter certificate does suggest that the “ideal manifestation”
of the work is to pour them on the floor where two walls meet (i.e., loosely piled in a corner in the
familiar way his work is shown). Id. That is not a requirement, however, and even where followed
that method results in candies scattering. See “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.), ART INSTITUTE OF
CHICAGO, http://www.artic.edu/aic/collections/artwork/152961 [https://perma.cc/3VVX-R8VS] (Art
Institute of Chicago listing for “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in L.A.) noting “[d]imensions vary with
installation”).
119. See infra Part II.B. These copyrightability arguments regarding conceptual and minimalist art
are beyond the scope of the Article. The point for these purposes, however, is not to argue that all
works captured in Permissive Certificates are copyrightable, particularly given how many different
and varied art practices use such certificates, but rather that there is at least a colorable claim of
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Another material feature of most licensing arrangements is that they
create bilateral contracts insofar as both parties agree to perform acts
under the agreement, and failure to perform can lead to a claim for breach
of contract.120 Often the licensee is required not only to pay royalties or
an up-front payment as consideration for the license, but also to use the
copyrighted work or mark or name in certain ways but not others.121
Critically, uses of licensed rights outside the scope of a copyright
license are breaches of the license, and amount to infringements if they
are conditions of that license.122 The same generally holds for holdover
licensees who continue to use the once-licensed works, marks, or names
after termination of the license (for instance, after termination for
breach).123
These provisions thus provide a substantial amount of ongoing control
to the licensor (or artist, in the case of this Article). For instance, where a
gallery duly attained a license to post a limited set of existing images of
an artist’s work on its website, the gallery was exposed to claims of

copyrightability in many cases.
120. Bilateral Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 391 (10th ed. 2014).
121. See Bunn-O-Matic Corp. v. Bunn Coffee Serv., Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 914, 921–22 (C.D. Ill.
2000) (use of BUNN trademark in form not authorized by license is a breach and an infringement);
PATRY, supra note 104, § 5:126, at 5-295 to 5-296, 5-295 n.1 (copyright licensee “may place
conditions on the exercise of a license, and any use inconsistent with those conditions or otherwise
outside the scope of the license will expose the licensee to an infringement claim”) (collecting cases).
122. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 939 (9th Cir. 2010). A copyright
infringement claim based on use outside the scope of the license will hold where (1) the copying is
“‘beyond the scope of a license possessed by the defendant,’ . . . and the source of the copyright
owner’s complaint must be grounded in a right protected by the Copyright Act, such as unlawful
reproduction or distribution.” Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc.,
421 F.3d 1307, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (first quoting Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assocs., Inc.,
144 F.3d 96, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1998); and then citing 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012)). In the trademark context,
use by a licensee which is outside the scope of the license is both trademark infringement and a breach
of contract. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 25:30, at 25-98, 25-98 n.2 (5th ed. 2019) (collecting cases).
123. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.15(A)(3)
(2019) (“[U]pon rescission, the assignment or license is terminated and the copyright proprietor may
hold the former grantee liable as an infringer for subsequent use of the work.”) (collecting cases);
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 119, § 25:30, at 25-98
(“[C]ontinued use by an ex-licensee after the license has been terminated is an act of trademark
infringement.”) (collecting cases).
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infringement when it created and posted its own new images of the same
works.124 The same principle holds on the trademark side.125
The right of publicity raises unique issues in the licensing context, due
both to state law variations and its close relationship to the right of privacy
(which is often treated as an issue of consent or waiver rather than
license).126 An in-depth analysis of the distinction between licenses and
waivers is beyond the scope of this Article. Either way, however, in many
cases courts appear equally willing to find that a living person permitted
the use of his or her name as they are with the license of a corporate
trademark.127
b.

The Trademark and Right of Publicity First-Sale Doctrine and the
Dastar Objection

Although, as just described, it is common practice to grant permission
to use trademark and publicity rights, courts often eschew a license-based
framework in favor of a first-sale paradigm when it comes to sales or
displays of goods that use or embody another’s trademark or name.128 This
is particularly true in the absence of express licensing terms. That is

124. Teter v. Glass Onion, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1150 (W.D. Mo. 2010); see also, LGS
Architects, Inc. v. Concordia Homes of Nev., 434 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 2006), overruled on other
grounds by Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976, 979, 981 (9th Cir. 2011) (use of licensed
architectural plans to build additional homes in a new community exceeded the scope of the license
and subjected licensee to claims of copyright infringement); Reinsdorf v. Skechers U.S.A., 922 F.
Supp. 2d 866, 876 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (use of a licensed photograph beyond the six-month limit in the
license exposed company to claims of copyright infringement).
125. See, e.g., Franchised Stores of N.Y., Inc. v. Winter, 394 F.2d 664, 668 (2d Cir. 1968)
(authorized trademark licensee held a trademark infringer where he used unlicensed syrups in some
of his Carvel branded-products and sold some non-Carvel products at Carvel-branded stores).
126. MCCARTHY, supra note 106, § 10:30, at 499–501 (collecting state rules). One obvious
limitation with rights of publicity licenses is that many states do not (or previously did not) allow the
underlying rights to survive death. See generally Michael Decker, Goodbye, Norma Jean: Marilyn
Monroe and the Right of Publicity’s Transformation at Death, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 243
(2009) (discussing dispute over posthumous survival of Marilyn Monroe’s right of publicity).
127. This is particularly true in the digital environment. See, e.g., Perkins v. LinkedIn Corp., 53 F.
Supp. 3d 1190, 1214–15 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (similar holding under California common law right of
publicity); Pratt v. Everalbum, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 3d 664, 668 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (finding under Illinois
law that plaintiff consented to use of his name by a smartphone app where the app indicated that it
would invite his friends, asked for access to his contacts, and informed him that the messages would
be sent “via SMS”).
128. See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ), Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that reseller
eBay may use plaintiff’s TIFFANY trademark to describe accurately the genuine Tiffany goods
offered for sale on its website); Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Int’l Sec. Exch., Inc., 451 F.3d 295, 308 (2d
Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of trademark complaint where defendant used plaintiff’s trademark to
accurately describe the name of shares covered by defendant’s option products).
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because owners of a genuine work do not need permission to call it what
it is or resell it as such. As one licensing treatise puts it:
The courts do not imply a license to use a trademark upon the sale
of a tangible item bearing the mark. Rather, they have developed
the concept of trademark first sale grounded in an idea of “fair
use,” allowing use of a trademark truthfully to identify the source
of an item.129
Under this framework, Tiffany & Co. could not use trademark law to
stop eBay from advertising genuine Tiffany merchandise and labeling it
accurately as Tiffany.130 Nor could McGraw-Hill, the owner of the
registered SPDR trademark for exchange-traded funds, prevent an
unlicensed option trading exchange from listing and trading genuine
SPDR options on its exchange.131 While a trademark conveys an exclusive
right to use the mark, that “right generally does not prevent one who trades
a branded product from accurately describing it by its brand name, so long
as the trader does not create confusion by implying an affiliation with the
owner of the product.”132
This trademark first-sale doctrine is, however, subject to an important
limitation for these purposes. Namely, it does not apply “when an alleged
infringer sells trademarked goods that are materially different than those
sold by the trademark owner.”133 Thus, the Sixth Circuit found error when
the district court dismissed a complaint brought by the owner of a
trademark for various audiobooks. The owner alleged that its rival was
buying, repackaging, and reselling those same audiobooks as different
editions for a different market.134 The court concluded that the differences
between the editions could have been material, so the plaintiff’s claims

129. 2 RAYMOND T. NIMMER & JEFF C. DODD, MODERN LICENSING LAW § 10:32 (2018–2019 ed.
2018).
130. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 103.
131. Dow Jones & Co., 451 F.3d at 308.
132. Id.
133. Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Commc’ns, Inc., 474 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir. 2007);
see also Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 150 F.3d 298, 302–03 (3d Cir. 1998); Martin’s Herend Imps.,
Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, Co., 112 F.3d 1296, 1301–02 (5th Cir. 1997); Societe Des
Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 638 (1st Cir. 1992); Original Appalachian
Artworks v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 1987); Abercrombie & Fitch v. Fashion
Shops of Ky., 363 F. Supp. 2d 952, 963–65 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (adopting this rule). This materiality
standard is judged not from the trademark owner’s (for instance, artist’s) perspective, but rather from
the purchasing public’s (i.e., art buyer’s) perspective, and is judged on a case by case basis. Brilliance
Audio, 474 F.3d at 370 (quoting Davidoff CIE, 263 F.3d at 1302 (“To be material, a difference must
be ‘one that consumers consider relevant to a decision about whether to purchase a product.’”).
134. Brilliance Audio, 474 F.3d at 370–71.
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should have been allowed to proceed.135 A different court likewise
allowed an artist to proceed with his claim for trademark infringement
against a gallery reselling his genuine works, but only because evidence
suggested that the gallery created the misimpression that it was a favored
or authorized dealer when it was not.136
Courts will similarly deny right of publicity infringement claims for
downstream (for instance, secondary) resales of genuine goods bearing a
celebrity’s name or image.137 For instance, the Eleventh Circuit denied
right of publicity claims brought by representatives of a famous athlete
and race car driver against a company that bought genuine trading cards
bearing their names and images, mounted them to plaques, and resold
them without permission.138
As with trademark cases, however, the first-sale defense will not bar
right of publicity cases where the goods are not in fact genuine. In a case
involving the late photographer Ansel Adams, for instance, right of
publicity and trademark claims survived a motion to dismiss allegations
that sixty-five “lost” negatives purportedly discovered by plaintiffs were
not in fact genuine and, therefore, could not be sold as the work of
Adams.139
Finally, whenever discussing trademark and right of publicity doctrine
in fine art it is important to spend a moment on Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp.140 In Dastar, the Supreme Court held that the
unfair competition provisions of the Lanham Act may not be used by an
author to challenge the omission of the author’s name from a product
containing the work (in that case, a videotape).141 That is because the
Court read the term “origin” in the Lanham Act narrowly to refer to the
origin of the physical product and not the author of the underlying
content.142 In short, Dastar ruled that the Lanham Act does not provide a
135. Id.
136. Teter v. Glass Onion, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1156 (W.D. Mo. 2010).
137. MCCARTHY, supra note 106, § 7:31 (“The issue is whether a celebrity (or deceased celebrity’s
successor) who licenses a product is entitled to a royalty upon every downstream resale of that product
thereafter. The first sale defense dictates that the answer is ‘no.’”).
138. Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1450 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding, “as a matter of
law, Vintage merely resells cards that it lawfully obtains”). Akin to the material differences exception in
trademark doctrine, the first sale doctrine in right of publicity cases does not apply to bona fide goods that
have been repackaged to the point of becoming “separate and distinct” products. Id.
139. Ansel Adams Publ’g Rights Tr. v. PRS Media Partners, LLC, No. C 10-03740 JSW, 2010 WL
4974114, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2010).
140. 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
141. Id. at 37–38.
142. Id.
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cause of action for failure to credit content creators (so-called reversepassing-off claims).143
It is difficult in the U.S. to even mention trademarks in the art context
without being met by the suggestion that the Dastar case somehow acts
as a bar or heavy limitation against trademark protection in that space.144
As a substantial swath of scholarship has attempted to show, however, the
reach of Dastar is not as great as its fearsome reputation might suggest.145
Relevant to this Article, Dastar has been interpreted not to apply to
affirmative passing off or false endorsement claims, wherein one falsely
uses an artist’s name or trademarks to imply that they endorse a work.146
Indeed, those claims are the exact opposite of the situation in Dastar.
In addition, Dastar certainly does not limit artists from attaining U.S.
trademark rights in their personal names. In the aforementioned case
concerning the painter Lee Teter, the court had no objection to Teter
asserting his own name as a trademark against his former gallery after a

143. Id.
144. To give just one anecdotal example, at a recent conference concerning authenticity in
posthumous sculpture at which the author was present, an audience member inquired whether
trademarks might play a role in policing posthumous artistic creations. A panelist more or less
dismissed the notion with a summary reference to the Dastar case. For an overview of the conference,
see generally, The Afterlife of Sculptures: Posthumous Casts in Scholarship, the Market, and the Law,
CATALOGUE RAISONNÉ SCHOLARS ASS’N, https://www.catalogueraisonne.org/events/2018/5/1/theafterlife-of-sculptures-posthumous-casts-in-scholarship-the-market-and-the-law
[https://perma.cc/4635-M4D8].
145. For scholarly approaches, see, for example, Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym:
Authorship, Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1432–44 (2005)
(distinguishing Dastar-type reverse passing off cases from affirmative passing off cases based on
authorship claims); Mark P. McKenna, Dastar’s Next Stand, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 357, 387 (2012)
(concluding, after thorough analysis of Dastar’s highly uncertain legacy, that it should be understood
to rule out “confusion that is attributable to the content of a creative work,” but not “trademark
protection for all copyrightable works”).
146. See, e.g., Adams, 2010 WL 4974114 at *3 (“Dastar Doctrine” inapplicable to affirmative false
designation and trademark claims brought by artist’s estate); Estate of Barré v. Carter, 272 F. Supp.
3d 906, 917, 944 (E.D. La. 2017) (allowing affirmative claim for false endorsement based on use of
“persona” over defendant’s Dastar arguments); Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 66 F. Supp. 3d
424, 454 n.19 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Dastar does not address whether a defendant’s unauthorized use of
copyrighted works, when occurring in conjunction with the defendant’s unauthorized use of protected
marks, can support a § 43(a) claim of an implied endorsement.”); Bach v. Forever Living Prods. U.S.,
Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (distinguishing Dastar as inapplicable where
artist pursues affirmative trademark infringement claims sounding in false endorsement or affiliation
as opposed to plagiarism). Dastar itself concerned a reverse passing off claim, wherein the defendant
(Dastar) was accused of false designation of origin based on its failure to credit the original author of
the work. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31. Trademark claims likely to arise in the context of certificates of
authenticity disputes, involving affirmative use of the artist’s name over the artist’s objections, are
thus the opposite of those at issue in Dastar.
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change of ownership led to a falling out between the parties.147 Along
these lines, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
expressly allows trademark registrations for artists with respect to use of
their names or their pseudonyms on their own original works of art.148
Dastar should therefore not be understood as to undermine the basic
relevance of trademark and right of publicity law to artists.
2.

The Exemplary Gonzalez-Torres and Evans Certificates are
Enforceable Contracts and Express Copyright Licenses that
Authorize Use of an Artist’s Name

This section applies U.S. contract and non-patent intellectual property
law to two certificates described in the first Part of this Article: the
Gonzalez-Torres certificate for “Untitled” 1989/1990 and the Evans
Certificate for With the advent of Radio Astronomy. These two works were
selected because both certificates are publicly available and were
produced relatively recently, and they are good examples of works with
strong conceptual content that regularly sell at auction (Gonzalez-Torres)
and commercial galleries (Evans). Moreover, there is at least a plausible
argument for applying U.S. law (in particular, the law of New York State)
to their interpretation.149

147. Teter v. Glass Onion, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1154–56 (W.D. Mo. 2010).
148. 2 U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 1202.09(b), at 1200–89 (5th ed. 2017). As a general rule, personal names may be trademarks where
they have developed secondary meaning in the minds of the public. 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13:1, at 13-3, § 13:2, at 13-9 (5th ed.
2019).
149. This jurisdiction was chosen primarily for analytic convenience, and because many fine art
cases are decided under New York law. With regard to Gonzalez-Torres, the certificate itself was
created on Andrea Rosen Gallery letterhead, then a New York gallery with a New York address listed,
which is also the location for The Felix Gonzalez-Torres Foundation which purports to own all of his
copyrights. “Untitled” 1989/1990 Certificate, supra note 56; see About, THE FELIX GONZALEZTORRES FOUNDATION, http://felixgonzalez-torresfoundation.org/about [https://perma.cc/4KLPX8QL] (asserting copyright ownership). The certificate for Evans’s piece was created on White Cube
gallery letterhead listing a London address, along with a Canadian affiliate. Evans Certificate, supra
note 77. Nevertheless, the gallery sold the work directly online and shipped outside the European
Union. See WHITE CUBE Online Listing, supra note 72. This means that it is plausible that New York
law would apply were a hypothetical buyer to reside in New York. See Tarbert Trading, Ltd. v.
Cometals, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 561, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (applying New York law to breach of contract
dispute between English seller and New York buyer for the sale of Kenyan kidney beans).
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The “Untitled” 1989/1990 and Evans Certificates Are Likely
Enforceable as Contracts

As a preliminary formal matter, both the “Untitled” 1989/1990 and
Evans Certificates are written documents, signed by the artist (Evans) or
his agent (the Gonzalez-Torres estate and gallery). Thus, they should both
be formally acceptable for enforcement against the artist or artist’s
representative.150
A trickier question is whether the artist could enforce them against the
buyer.151 The Gonzalez-Torres case is relatively easy here, as the buyers,
Rosa and Carlos de la Cruz, countersigned the certificate.152 But there is
no signature block for the buyers on the face of the Evans Certificate.153
Thus, counter-enforceability by Evans against a buyer will likely turn on
whether the buyers signed an accompanying bill of sale or invoice.154 For
a signed writing to constitute a binding contract, “the parties must make a
manifestation of mutual assent sufficiently definite to assure that they are
truly in agreement with respect to the material terms of their contract.”155
This is known as the “definiteness” requirement, which can be raised to
challenge ambiguous writings that omit material terms.156 Both the
“Untitled” 1989/1990 and Evans Certificates generally contain an
extensive number of definitive and sophisticated contractual requirements

150. U.C.C. § 2-201 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). For brevity, I am assuming
that the U.C.C. applies to these transactions because they are for the sale of “goods” that are movable,
existing and identified at the time of sale. Id. § 2-105 (definition of “Goods”). That is generally the
case for artworks. Balog v. Ctr. Art Gallery-Hawaii, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1556, 1562 (D. Haw. 1990)
(paintings, prints and sculpture fall within Uniform Commercial Code’s definition of “goods”); Teter,
723 F. Supp. 2d at 1150 (“artwork is a ‘good,’ and the sale of artwork is governed by the UCC”). One
could argue that conceptual artworks are neither moveable nor existing as goods at the time of sale,
but rather are more in the nature of designs or plans. Courts have held that the U.C.C. does not apply
to the sale of designs, technical drawings, and professional advice by licensors. See Snyder v. ISC
Alloys, Ltd., 772 F. Supp. 244, 253 (W.D. Pa. 1991). Such arguments, however, are beyond the scope
of this analysis.
151. These documents may be viewed as instruments of artist control; in which case the artist would
absolutely want to be able to assert it against the buyer. For this reason, it is advisable that artists have
buyers countersign Permissive Certificates as a matter of course.
152. “Untitled” 1989/1990 Certificate, supra note 56, at 6.
153. Evans Certificate, supra note 77.
154. See infra note 162, and accompanying text.
155. Aiello v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs. Corp., 973 N.Y.S.2d 88, 94 (App. Div. 2013). That is, “there
must be a meeting of the minds as to the essential terms of the agreement.” May v. Wilcox, 582
N.Y.S.2d 294, 294 (App. Div. 1992).
156. Aiello, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 94. That said, courts are reluctant to find contracts indefinite, and will
only strike down a contract as indefinite as a “last resort.” Id. at 95.
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that easily meet the definiteness standard.157 Neither the “Untitled”
1989/1990 nor Evans Certificates, however, say a word about payment or
consideration of any sort.
This same omission of a price term proved fatal to a contract involving
a certificate in a 2010 decision under New York law.158 In that case, the
parties disputed whether a freestanding certificate (entitled a “Certificate
of Authority”) given by the copyright owner to the defendant served to
extend an expired copyright license for the sale of Russian-language
videos. The certificate, however, failed to address the consideration,
licensing rate, or obligations of the parties with respect to the works at
issue. Thus, the court refused to validate it as a binding copyright license
on its own.159 Despite the similar “certificate” terminology at issue,
however, the case is distinguishable from this setting. There, the Second
Circuit put great weight on the fact that defendants were attempting to use
the Certificate of Authority to extend a prior license that had expired under
its own limited terms.160
Art transactions arise in a very different context. Fine art certificates of
authenticity rarely exist in isolation. They are provided to complement
bills of sale and not to challenge them. The silence of the certificates
themselves is not reflective of the absence of a price term, but that the
certificate is not an appropriate place to list it.161 Consistent with this
notion, under the Uniform Commercial Code, the price need not appear
on the face of the contract because the Code recognizes that in many cases
“the parties have based their agreement on a price list or catalogue known
to both of them.”162
157. See supra, Part I(C).
158. Close-Up Int’l, Inc. v. Berov, 382 F. App’x 113, 116 (2d Cir. 2010).
159. Id. (affirming grant of summary judgment denying existence of copyright or trademark license
where a Certificate of Authority was issued “pursuant to the contract in force between the parties”
and that contract had expired on its own terms). In the same (unreported) case, the federal appellate
court in New York also concluded that a bare document, which was styled a “Certificate of
Authority,” could not by itself alter or extend the terms of a complete, prior license agreement that
had expired. Id. at 115.
160. Id. The (unreported) case should thus be understood only to stand for the proposition that a
freestanding Permissive Certificate will not be interpreted to alter or extend an otherwise integrated
and complete prior agreement between the parties.
161. Among other reasons, the certificates are often made public (as with the two discussed here)
and private art buyers and sellers often prefer to keep sales prices confidential. See, e.g., THOMPSON,
supra note 30, at 193–94 (describing art world resistance to transparent pricing).
162. See U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). Courts in New York
have similarly interpreted bills of sale together with other documents relating to the same fine art
transaction to form a single contract if they “form part of a single transaction and are designed to
effectuate the same purpose.” Edelman Arts, Inc. v. Art Int’l (UK) Ltd., 841 F. Supp. 2d 810, 823
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (construing contract for sale of fine art by reading bill of sale in connection with
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Turning back to the works at issue here, the Evans piece easily satisfies
this standard. The White Cube gallery website advertised a sales listing,
complete with the £1,020 sticker price, including the Evans Certificate.163
The “Untitled” 1989/1990 Certificate is less definitive, but it states that
its terms are “integral conditions to the sale of the work” which suggests
the existence of a separate but integrated bill of sale or invoice for the
piece.164 So long as the parties created a bill of sale and rendered payment
in connection with executing the “Untitled” 1989/1990 Certificate, this
objection to its enforceability as a contract is readily overcome.
Finally, where “it is clear from the language of an agreement that the
parties intended to be bound” the court will “endeavor to hold the parties
to their bargain.”165 Although there is strong evidence of an intent to be
bound on the face of the “Untitled” 1989/1990 Certificate,166 intent to
bind the buyer is less clear in the Evans case as it lacks a buyer’s signature
block. Nevertheless, certain terms in the contract so clearly apply only to
the buyer (such as, “[t]his certificate must accompany the work”) that a
court might be willing to infer an intent to bind such parties.167
Some scholars, in particular Professor Joan Kee, have pushed back on
a reading of Gonzalez-Torres certificates of authenticity as properly
enforceable contracts.168 In questioning their contractual validity, Kee
observes that “the certificates often expressed the artist’s intentions as
choices owners could make rather than as conditions that had to be
fulfilled, or even obligations they were bound to perform.”169 Also
problematic to Kee is that they do not “specify or suggest how legal
sanctions could be taken to force bearers to fulfill the certificates’s terms

related faxes); see also Richman v. Brookhaven Servicing Corp., 363 N.Y.S.2d 731, 733 (Dist. Ct.
1975) (“It is not essential to the validity of a contract that the consideration be recited therein since it
may be implied, or proved by parol evidence.”); 22 N.Y. JUR. 2D CONTRACTS § 59 (2019)
(consideration may be implied and not expressly stated in instrument).
163. See WHITE CUBE Online Listing, supra note 72. Presumably buyers also received an invoice
with actual purchase.
164. “Untitled” 1989/1990 Certificate, supra note 56, at 6; see also, Kee, Felix Gonzalez-Torres,
supra note 54, at 523 (suggesting that the certificates accompanied a bill of sale or invoice).
165. 166 Mamaroneck Ave. Corp. v. 151 E. Post Rd. Corp., 78 N.Y.2d 88, 91 (1991).
166. The final paragraph before the signature block explicitly requires the buyer’s “agreement to
these terms which are integral conditions to the sale of the work . . . and completes the binding nature
of this contract.” “Untitled” 1989/1990 Certificate, supra note 56, at 6.
167. Evans Certificate, supra note 77.
168. Kee, Felix Gonzalez-Torres, supra note 54, at 521 (“[T]he lack of enforceability may bar
González-Torres’s certificates from being properly known as contracts.”).
169. Id. at 519.
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or to compensate the artist (or his estate) for non-fulfillment of the
same.”170
Neither of these concerns, however, should prevent a court from
reading the certificate here as an enforceable contract. It is certainly true
that many of the provisions of Gonzalez-Torres’s certificates intentionally
give significant discretion to owners of his works. Gonzalez-Torres left
many choices (such as the precise height of the paper stacks in “Untitled”
1989/1990 or the arrangement of his candy spills) to the owners of the
pieces. These choices are a core component of the aesthetic of the work.171
There is nothing, however, problematic or unenforceable about giving
discretion to one party to a contract. Most enforceable contracts contain
wide areas of discretion.172 This is especially true in the field of licensing,
where licensees often have significant discretion within parameters built
into the use of licensed property. To take just one example, a standard
form contract for the reproduction of sculptures found in a commercial
database gives the licensee discretion to choose how many sculptures to
reproduce up to a maximum amount, where to sell those works in the
world, who to retain to manufacture the copies, and when to commence
with production.173
Nor is there any requirement—or even a suggestion—that a contract
enumerate a sanction for failure to comply with its terms. Courts will
simply default to standard remedies where the contract is silent.174
In short, Kee may be correct in her suggestion that the discretionary
nature of Gonzalez-Torres certificates, their silence as to sanction for
breach, and their overall imprecision render them ambiguous, coy, or even
strategically porous contracts.175 But, in the event of a dispute between the
current owner and the estate, that would not stop a court from formally
recognizing this signed, dense, document to be a binding agreement and
interpreting it as best it can.

170. Id. at 521 (referencing Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 58 (1963)).
171. KEE, MODELS, supra note 30, at 225 (“The point was not simply about giving owners freedom
of choice, but about claiming that there was no one right choice.”).
172. See, e.g., Siporin v. Adler, 111 N.W.2d 848, 850–51 (Mich. 1961) (affirming the validity of a
contract placing payment of an employee bonus entirely at the discretion of the employer); Howtek,
Inc. v. Relisys, 958 F. Supp. 46, 48 (D.N.H. 1997) (“The fact that an agreement grants a party some
degree of discretion in performing does not render the agreement unenforceable.”).
173. 5B AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS § 72:173, at 722–32 (2d ed. 2014).
174. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-703-711 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (discussing a
buyer’s remedies in general).
175. Kee, Felix Gonzalez-Torres, supra note 54, at 526–27.
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Gonzalez-Torres’s “Untitled” 1989/1990 Certificate and the Evans
Certificate Are Express Copyright Licenses of Copyrightable
Works

Assuming a court were to find that the certificates and any related
documents comprise enforceable contracts, then they would likely also be
interpreted to be express, written copyright licenses.
Taking each in turn, Gonzalez-Torres’s “Untitled” 1989/1990 opens
by defining the subject work by title, dimensions, catalogue number, and
a dense paragraph of text delimiting the content of the work. It then
explicitly states that “the owner has the right to reprint sheets” and “the
right to manifest the work at any time.”176
The first clause is an explicit grant of the reproduction right with
respect to the printed sheets which make up the physical manifestation of
the work.177 The second clause is slightly more ambiguous as it uses a
term, “manifest,” which is not defined in the Copyright Act.178 That term,
however, when used as a verb, means “to make evident or certain by
showing or displaying.”179 Under that definition, the second clause tracks
the public display right.180 A court would therefore likely (and rightly)
read this document as a license by the copyright owner (at the time, the
Gonzalez-Torres estate) of the right to reproduce and publicly display
“Untitled” 1989/1990.181
Much the same can be said for the Evans Certificate. It, too, permits
reproduction of the text artwork when it states, “Only to be reproduced
using the [digital] file supplied at the time of purchase.”182 The reasonable
negative inference of that statement is that reproductions using the proper
digital file are allowed. Similarly, the instructions regarding size, scale,
176. “Untitled” 1989/1990 Certificate, supra note 56, at 1.
177. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2012).
178. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (providing no definition for “manifest”).
179. Manifest, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/manifest
[https://perma.cc/8B97-A6LT].
180. 17 U.S.C. § 106(5). The Copyright Act already allows an exception to the public display right
for owners of lawfully made copies. 17 U.S.C. § 109(c). Accordingly, it is not technically necessary
to also license the public display right so long as the artwork owner has been given the right to make
an authorized copy. Nevertheless, it would be understandable for a licensee to desire such an express
permission as an added safeguard. This reading is confirmed by a later provision that gives rules for
when “this work is publicly exhibited by the owner” or a borrowing institution. “Untitled” 1989/1990
Certificate, supra note 56, at 2.
181. This, of course, assumes the copyrightability of the underlying work. See below for a
discussion of that issue.
182. Evans Certificate, supra note 77; WHITE CUBE Online Listing, supra note 60 (stating the
purchaser attains a digital file on a CD that contains the text used to realize the artwork).
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and thickness of the lettering all imply a permission on the part of the
certificate’s owner to print such letters (so long as they comply with the
instructions) in order to realize the work. A court would have to bend over
backwards to deny that a purchaser has the right to reproduce at least one
version of the artwork at a time.
In much the same vein, arguably the certificate also grants a license for
public display. Specifically, it states, “[o]nly one copy of the artwork
should be displayed by a single owner at any given time.”183 Just as before,
the logical inference is that a single owner has permission to display one
copy of the work at a given time.
An additional question in the copyright context concerns exclusivity.184
Here, it seems obvious that the copyright license in the Evans Certificate
is meant to be non-exclusive. On its own terms, it is an edition of twentyfive, and the suggestion is that each owner will receive a certificate for
each respective edition of the work.185
The “Untitled” 1989/1990 Certificate is a thornier matter when it
comes to exclusivity. In favor of finding the license to be exclusive, the
certificate repeatedly and consistently refers to the work as being a
“unique art work.”186 Uniqueness implies exclusivity. Thus, the owners of
the piece would have a strong claim that only they have the right to
reproduce the stacks. On the other hand, the uniqueness of an original
artwork is not the same as the uniqueness of the license or right of
reproduction. This is a straightforward proposition in the traditional art
context, where one can be the only owner of a Jackson Pollock oil painting
without being the exclusive licensee allowed to reproduce it.187
This distinction, though, breaks down in a dematerialized work like
Gonzalez-Torres’s “Untitled” 1989/1990, where the very essence of the
unique original is reproducibility. In such a case, what could it mean that
Rosa and Carlos de la Cruz are the owners of a “unique art work” other
than that they are the only ones with the right to reproduce the paper stacks
containing the phrases on them described in the certificate? The work is
183. Evans Certificate, supra note 77.
184. See, e.g., Jacob Maxwell, Inc. v. Veeck, 110 F.3d 749, 753 (11th Cir. 1997) (analyzing
whether license was exclusive or nonexclusive for purposes of determining whether implied oral
license had validly been created).
185. Evans Certificate, supra note 77 (this is inherent in the notion that the physical certificate must
accompany the work).
186. “Untitled” 1989/1990 Certificate, supra note 56, at 1; see also id. at 2 (referring to the
“uniqueness” of the work).
187. See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (codified in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). Under the Act, ownership of a copyright is distinct from ownership
of a material copy, including the original copy. See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2012).
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meant to be created anew with each showing and is depleted over time as
visitors take sheets away with them.
To make matters even more complicated, according to Emilie Keldie,
director of the Gonzalez-Torres Foundation, the archives maintained in
the Foundation include information that shows an owner of a single
Gonzalez-Torres spill or stack has the right to loan the artwork to another
institution (thereby authorizing the installation of a candy pile at the
borrowing museum) while simultaneously maintaining a second stack at
the owner’s home.188 Indeed, an owner may even install more than one
stack at a time in a single location (imagine candy piles in every corner of
a museum). None of this impugns the uniqueness of the work as a single
aesthetic piece.189
Even under this expansive reading, the license may be understood as
exclusive in the sense that only one party (the current owner) has the
authority to sublicense rights to a third party (the borrowing institution).
As with most intellectual property licenses, the exclusivity relates not to
the number of tangible manifestations of the work, but rather to the right
to authorize the creation of such manifestations.
Finally, there remains the question of copyrightability. This Article
contends that more likely than not both artworks are copyrightable under
current law. As discussed above, the two primary challenges offered
against the copyrightability of artwork with conceptual content is that it is
“inherently changing” and, thus, not “fixed” under section 102(a),190 and
that such works are fundamentally only a “concept” or “idea” and barred
by section 102(b).191 Neither should pose a problem in these cases.
Looking first to Evans’s work,192 the easier of the two to analyze, it is
clearly fixed in the form of the digital of wall text provided with purchase.
Although there is some variability with respect to the dimensions of the
text, that is true for all copyrightable text-based works such as poems. And
apart from the text, the certificate dictates that the owner may make no
other modifications. As for the idea/expression dichotomy, that should
pose no problems as well. Again, the analogy to poetry is apt. Although
Evans is a conceptual artist, and reproducible text art clearly has a
conceptual component, it is difficult to imagine a court that would refuse

188. See Telephone Interview with Emilie Keldie, Director, Felix Gonzalez-Torres Foundation
(Mar. 27, 2019).
189. See id.
190. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
191. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); see also supra Part II(B)(1)(a).
192. See Evans Certificate, supra note 77.
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to treat this seventy-three-word paragraph as anything other than
protectable expression.193
Gonzalez-Torres’s “Untitled” 1989/1990 may be a tougher case but it
is likely the work is still copyrightable. With respect to fixation,
specifically the Copyright Act requirement that a work must be
“sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration[,]”194 it is important to start by distinguishing his stacks from his
candy spills. The latter generally consist of hard candies of an “ideal
weight” that may be exhibited in whatever physical shape the owner
wishes.195 The shape then necessarily changes unpredictably as viewers
remove the candies throughout the day from the original spill pile (itself
of highly variable dimensions).
The subject stack work at issue, however, must be exhibited in the form
of two stacks, placed ten inches apart. Each sheet in the stacks must
always contain the precise language defined by Gonzalez-Torres, and the
text must be centered on the sheet. Although a particular height of the
stacks is not mandated, Gonzalez-Torres prescribes an “ideal” height for
the starting point of the stacks. In addition, and even more so than with
the candy spills, the stacks will reduce in size in a very predictable way as
viewers take a page away—with each sheet removed, the stack gets one
sheet-width shorter but retains its rectangular form. This is a dynamic
artwork, but one that is dynamic within well-defined parameters. It is not
nearly as variable as, for instance, the living wildflower garden that was
denied copyright protection on fixation grounds.196 To that end, GonzalezTorres himself referred to his stack works as “sculptures” in recognition
of their defined form.197
With respect to idea/expression concerns,198 again, this is a more
challenging work for establishing copyrightability than that by Evans,
193. Cf. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–46 (1991) (affirming
copyrightability of poems even where two poets create the same poem independent of each other).
194. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “fixed”).
195. See, e.g., Certificate of Authenticity and Ownership for Untitled (L.A.) at 1, 2 (noting that
“[e]ach manifestation of the work may physically differ according to the owner’s ongoing right to
interpret the specific, yet open-ended parameters of the work”) (on file with author); Certificate of
Authenticity and Ownership for Untitled (Portrait of Dad) 1991, reproduced at 26 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y APP. 1 (2017). The latter certificate does suggest that the “ideal manifestation” of the
work is to pour them on the floor where two walls meet (i.e., loosely piled in a corner in the familiar
way his work is shown). That is not a requirement, however.
196. Cf. Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 305 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that the artist’s
garden installation was “not stable or permanent enough to be called ‘fixed’”).
197. Kee, MODELS, supra note 30, at 222–23.
198. Exemplifying the idea/expression challenges faced by minimalist art, the Copyright Office

12 - Karol (3).docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

10/29/2019 4:08 PM

PERMISSIVE CERTIFICATES

1217

given its near-minimalist aesthetic.199 It would be a deep misreading of
the piece, however, to suggest that Gonzalez-Torres was capturing only
an “idea,” such as the idea of art that can be taken away by a viewer, as
opposed to giving form to expression. As curator and art historian Nicolas
Bourriaud contends of an analogous stack piece, it is not merely “a poster
hand-out, but a work endowed with a defined form and a certain density,
a work not displaying its construction (or dismantlement) process, but the
form of its presence amid an audience.”200
Bourriaud goes on to expand on the role of pairings and dualism in
Gonzalez-Torres (the necessary form of two stacks; the relation between
stacks and viewer), reflective of his deep commitment to exploring human
couples and the brutal loss of his partner to AIDS, and contrasts “the
simplicity of the forms used by the artist” with “their tragic and militant
content.”201 Whether we agree with Bourriaud’s “relational aesthetics” or
not, the existence of a substantial body of scholarship focused on the
expressive choices made by Gonzalez-Torres lends strong credence to its
existence as (often haunting) aesthetic expression and not mere idea.202
c.

The Certificates Evidence the Owners’ Right to Use the Artists’
Names in Connection with Exhibition or Sale of the Genuine
Artwork

The owner of “Untitled” 1989/1990 or an edition of With the advent of
Radio Astronomy does not want merely to recreate and display the work.
The institutional or private collector will want freedom to inform the

recently and controversially denied registration to Cady Noland’s famed Log Cabin work for being
just that—a façade of a log cabin. See REV. BD., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., APP. SER. NO. SR 15582119381, LETTER RE: SECOND REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION FOR REFUSAL TO REGISTER LOG
CABIN
(2018),
https://www.copyright.gov/rulings-filings/review-board/docs/log-cabin.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FN8J-5GRJ] [hereinafter LETTER RE: SECOND REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION].
199. Here, for instance, the piece consists of just ten words, which makes a poetry analogy more
difficult. This would also open the piece up to an attack based on the de minimis doctrine if the work
consisted only of text. Cf. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE CIRCULAR 33 (“Words
and short phrases . . . are uncopyrightable because they contain an insufficient amount of
authorship.”). Here, however, text is just one aspect of a much more complete and complex artwork.
The Copyright Office (controversially) denied registration. See LETTER RE: SECOND REQUEST FOR
RECONSIDERATION, supra note 198.
200. BOURRIAUD, Relational Aesthetics, supra note 30, at 49 (emphasis omitted).
201. Id. at 52–53.
202. As Professor Said poignantly notes of the candy spill work “Untitled” (Portrait of Ross in
L.A.) (1991), the 175-pound ideal weight of the pile prescribed in the certificate “represented the ideal
weight of Gonzalez-Torres’s lover, who lost weight as a side effect of AIDS, wasting away as his
sickness intensified.” Said, supra note 92, at 348. For many museum-goers, the act of removing or
even eating one of the proffered candies from this work, in light of its expressed meaning, becomes
spiritually powerful, indeed haunting, in all the ways we hope for great works of art.
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world that the work is by Felix Gonzalez-Torres or Cerith Wyn Evans,
respectively, particularly when trying to resell or donate it.
In an institutional setting, this would come in the familiar form of a
didactic museum wall text or label providing the artist’s name. In a gallery
or auction setting, the name might further appear next to prices or lot
descriptions and estimates. Each would surely also want to use the name
on collateral materials for the sale or show on the website, traditional
poster and print advertising, social media, etc. As shown at the outset with
respect to the Hirst Bombay Mix dispute, if and when that individual seeks
to sell the work, the artist’s name can be worth hundreds of thousands of
dollars.
Do the certificates for these works grant such a right to their owners?
Indirectly, yes. While the documents might not rise to the level of
affirmative trademark or right-of-publicity licenses, by certifying the
authenticity of the subject works they effectively immunize the owners
from trademark and right of publicity claims so long as the owners do not
falsely affiliate themselves with the artist or estate, and so long as the
works comply with the certificate instructions.
When it comes to trademark and right of publicity rights, certificates
function slightly differently than with respect to copyright. In the
copyright space, as shown above, the certificates grant affirmative
copyright rights such as of reproduction or display. They create express
copyright licenses. For trademarks and rights of publicity, however, they
do not affirmatively authorize the owner/buyer of a work to apply a
particular label or use an artist’s name in connection with sale of the work.
Instead, they speak in terms of confirming the source and authenticity of
the piece.
For instance, the Evans Certificate does not license the right to use
Evans’s name in connection with sale or exhibition of the work. Instead,
it attributes authorship of the piece to Evans,203 and then conditions its
certification of authenticity on the buyer/owner adhering to its terms.204
Similarly, nowhere in the six pages of text in the “Untitled” 1989/1990
Certificate is there any express grant of permission to use GonzalezTorres’s name. There are, however, numerous statements that make clear
that the work is by Felix Gonzalez-Torres.205 The entire contract—
203. As with the Gonzalez-Torres work, Evans’s name appears atop the Certificate, and he signed
it. See Evans Certificate, supra note 77.
204. Id. (“Any reproduction of the above artwork is only guaranteed to be an authentic work of art
by Cerith Wyn Evans when all reproduction requirements listed above have been met and
accompanied by this certificate.”).
205. Each and every page of the document contains the artist’s full name in capital letters at the
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presumably including its basic certification function—is then integrally
conditioned on the buyers following its terms.206 Both works are also
entitled “Certificate of Authenticity.”207
In other words, with respect to their author-source certification (for
instance, trademark and right of publicity) function, these documents
operate not by licensing a right to use the artist’s name, but by
conditionally warranting the genuineness of the work as by the artist. This
is best understood not as an affirmative trademark or right of publicity
license, but rather as a conditional statement of authenticity.208 That, in
turn, tracks the narrow first-sale exceptions to trademark and right of
publicity claims discussed above.209 This is true for the same reasons that
the owner of a genuine thing, like a Tiffany necklace or Orel Hershiser
baseball card, has the right to call it that and resell it under that brand or
name.210
Under this line of cases, in the U.S., the owner of a genuine artwork
does not need an affirmative license to list the name of the true artist that
created it in connection with its resale or display, or to show an artist’s
signature or stamp. This is because neither an artist nor an estate could
bring a viable trademark or right of publicity claim to prevent them from
doing so.211 Such a question, moreover, will likely not turn on whether
there was a license but rather on whether the certificate is valid and the
work materially unchanged from that described in the certificate.212
In sum, the trademark and right of publicity function of Permissive
Certificates is not to license the use of the artist’s name, but rather to

top, and the first page uses possessive punctuation to state that “Felix Gonzalez-Torres’[s] “Untitled”,
(sic) 1989/1990 . . . is a unique work owned by Rosa and Carlos de la Cruz.” It is also stamped with
his signature by the estate. “Untitled” 1989/1990 Certificate, supra note 56, at 5 (describing stamp)
and 6 (showing signature).
206. Id. at 6.
207. The “Untitled” 1989/1990 Certificate adds the phrase “and Ownership” to its title. See
generally id.
208. For example, one that can be revoked if the terms of the certificate are not adhered.
209. See supra Part II(B)(1)(b). As above, I am assuming that there had already been a bona fide
first sale of the work in connection with initial provision of the certificate.
210. Id.
211. The owner may not, however, otherwise falsely suggest a connection to the artist or estate
beyond the mere authenticity of the work. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 102–03 (2d
Cir. 2010) (“[A] defendant may lawfully use a plaintiff’s trademark where doing so is necessary to
describe the plaintiff’s product and does not imply a false affiliation or endorsement by the plaintiff
of the defendant.”).
212. See supra Part II(B)(1)(b).
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evidence the work’s genuineness and thereby insulate a bona fide owner
from trademark or right of publicity claims.213
III. IMPLICATIONS
Two primary implications follow from the fact that Permissive
Certificates function as contractually binding licenses and guarantees of
source. First, from an on-the-ground perspective, it would establish
Permissive Certificates as a powerful, practical, and market-accepted tool
for artist control. Where moral rights doctrines do not provide legal
entitlements, a Permissive Certificate can be wielded to enforce strict
compliance with the certificate through the threat of legal sanction. Or,
more potently, it could provide a tool for the artist or successor to prevent
resale or revoke the original sale entirely. Second, considered more
abstractly, this conclusion further positions the Certificate of Authenticity
as the locus of value for reproducible artworks at a moment when
reproducibility is increasingly at the heart of artistic practice. In this sense,
collectors of art become collectors of permissions. Each is discussed in
turn below.
A.

Permissive Certificates as a Tool for Artist Control

This section argues, descriptively, that Permissive Certificates are
poised to become a legal tool for artist control—one more useful to artists
and their estates, perhaps, than U.S. moral rights legislation. First, it
briefly reviews the avenues for artist control under current law. Next, it
shows how Permissive Certificates allow for private controls through
contractual restriction and scope limitations. It then turns to resale
restriction and termination, arguing that through Permissive Certificates
an artist or artist’s estate might deprive a collector of the ability to sell or
show an artwork in their collection.

213. One might attempt to distinguish the first sale cases by pointing to the fact the certified
artworks at issue here (by definition) have not yet been completely realized at the moment of sale. As
discussed in Part I(D), the authentication function is operating prospectively. That is different from a
Tiffany necklace, which was created and stamped TIFFANY once and for all by Tiffany prior to the
first sale. Nevertheless, the point of the first sale doctrine with respect to source authentication is that
once the work has been authenticated, the buyer has a right to tell the world its source. This would
appear to hold regardless of whether the artist chose to authenticate the piece in advance on spec
rather than after fabrication, so long as it has not been materially altered. See Carpenter & Hetcher,
supra note 110.
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The Problem of Artist Control and Moral Rights Law in the United
States

In the fine arts context, moral rights generally provide artists with rights
to preserve the integrity (for instance, prevent mutilation or destruction)
of an artwork after it has been sold; receive credit for the work (or be
entitled to revoke credit where it is no longer the work of that artist); and
choose when and how to divulge the work to the public.214 These noneconomic rights are particularly strong in European countries, such as
France, where they cannot be assigned and even survive the death of the
artist.215 They are notoriously weak in the United States, however.216
Once an artist sells a traditional artwork in the United States, that artist
has few means of controlling what the new owner does with it. Copyright
law allows the artist to prevent reproductions of the work,217 but the first
sale doctrine and exceptions to the public display right mean that there is
little the artist can do through copyright law to prevent resale or display
of the work.218 The circumscribed moral rights provisions contained in the
Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) prevent mutilations, distortions,
destructions and other modifications of certain unique and limited edition
artworks in some cases,219 and allow visual artists to disclaim authorship
in others,220 but those provisions are gap-ridden and have not proved
themselves to be a fertile source of artist control.221
214. See generally 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.01 (2019).
215. Id.
216. See infra note 221 (collecting scholarship on this point).
217. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2012).
218. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(a),(c) (2012).
219. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(a)(2), (a)(3).
220. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1).
221. It is beyond the scope of this paper to address gaps in U.S. moral rights law in any depth.
Other scholars, however, have given this issue substantial attention. See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal
Kwall, How Fine Art Fares Post VARA, 1 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (1997) (assessing
weaknesses in VARA through review of early case law); Roberta R. Kwall, “Author-Stories:”
Narrative’s Implications for Moral Rights and Copyright’s Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 22 (2001) (noting that “[m]any articles have lamented the absence of adequate moral rights
protection in the United States” and collecting the same); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim
Authorship in U.S. Copyright and Trademarks Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 263, 300 (2004); Rebecca
Stuart, A Work of Heart: A Proposal for a Revision of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 to Bring
the United States Closer to International Standards, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 645, 646 (2007)
(observing that “[t]he American legal system places a lower value on the works of visual artists than
foreign legal systems by failing to provide protection for the moral rights of all artists.”); 3 NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.02(A) (2019) (acknowledging that the “scope [of US moral rights law] is limited
even within the realm of visual arts”); Robert C. Bird, Moral Rights: Diagnosis and Rehabilitation,
46 AM. BUS. L.J. 407, 408 (2009).
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To name just a few limitations, for post-1990 works, VARA
protections die with the artist,222 its most potent provisions apply only to
works of “recognized stature,”223 it exempts negligent art conservation
and exhibition decisions,224 and it covers only traditional, copyrightable
“work[s] of visual art.”225 This latter limitation is especially problematic
for works captured in Permissive Certificates, which are generally not
traditional, unique art objects. Nor does the U.S. allow an artist to prevent
or profit from resale of the artist’s work through a droit de suite (for
instance, a right to receive a percentage of the resale price when an
artwork is later sold by an original buyer).226 State law protections, for
their part, form an irregular patchwork and are largely preempted by
VARA with respect to visual art.227
There is far from an academic consensus that VARA protections should
be increased, with prominent scholars having indicated their opposition to
moral rights legislation.228 Regardless of how one feels about the
normative value of moral rights in the abstract, however, artists regularly
do, in fact, attempt to control their works after sale.229 Indeed, artists have
attempted to overcome VARA limitations through the development, for
instance, of form contracts designed to give the artist downstream control
of sold artworks.230 In part due to market rejection of their onerous terms,
222. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1).
223. 17 U.S.C. § 106(A)(a)(3)(B).
224. 17 U.S.C. § 106(A)(c)(2).
225. 17 U.S.C. § 106(A)(a) (limiting the application of the act to works of visual art); 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (defining work of visual art to exclude, inter alia, non-copyrightable, audiovisual, works in
editions of more than 200 copies).
226. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, Resale Royalties: An Updated Analysis 6 (2013),
https://www.copyright.gov/docs/resaleroyalty/usco-resaleroyalty.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DK8V7K6U] (describing the history of failed attempts to pass a resale royalty in the U.S.). California’s state
resale royalty law, which originally required that an artist domiciled in California be paid a 5% royalty
on all resales of that artist’s work, has been narrowed to the point of irrelevance by recent court
decisions. See, e.g., Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320, 1322 (9th Cir. 2015)
(holding the act unconstitutional as applied to sales outside of California); Close v. Sotheby’s, Inc.,
894 F.3d 1061, 1072 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that the Copyright Act preempts California Resale
Royalty Act for claims arising after January 1, 1978).
227. 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(1) (2012). To be sure, when VARA does apply, it can be quite a power
tool. See, e.g., Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 427–28 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (affirming
$6.75 million VARA judgment for willful destruction of aerosol art).
228. See, e.g., Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 265 (2009) (arguing
“moral rights laws endanger art in the name of protecting it”).
229. See, e.g., Karol, Termination, supra note 17, at 212–13 (discussing the same).
230. The most well-known of these is the Artist’s Reserved Rights Transfer and Sale Agreement
developed by Professors Robert Projansky and Seth Siegelaub in 1973. See In Deed Catalog, supra
note 7, at 51 (reprinting the same). Among other things, it grants artists “ongoing control over the
exhibition, reproduction, and maintenance of their work, as well as a 15% resale royalty[.]” Buskirk,
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however, these agreements (in contrast to Permissive Certificates
generally) have never been widely adopted.231
2.

Artist Control by Contractual/License Restrictions

a.

Enforcement of Contract Terms

The most immediate means through which artists could use Permissive
Certificates as a form of control over the uses to which buyers put their
art would be to enforce their terms as binding contract restrictions. 232
Imagine, for instance, that a purchaser of one of the twenty-five
editions of Cerith Wyn Evans’s, With the advent of Radio Astronomy,
decides to create two copies of the work so that she can keep one at her
home while she loans another copy to a traveling exhibition. This is
technically easy to accomplish, as the buyer possesses a CD and can print
as much vinyl text as she wishes. This is, however, arguably a violation
of the clause reading, “[o]nly one copy of the artwork should be displayed
by a single owner at any given time.”233 Were the certificate enforceable
as a contract, then Evans could demand that a court enforce the provision
by enjoining the buyer’s efforts. A similar argument could be made should
the buyer use a slightly different font type from that prescribed by the
digital file, thereby contravening the requirement, “[a]part from the scale
of the text, there must be no other modifications to the design.”234 In such
a case, Evans could assert the contract to prevent modifications.
The Gonzalez-Torres case is slightly different. As Kee emphasizes,
many of the instructional guidelines in the “Untitled” 1989/1990
certificate are simply recommendations, as shown by repeated use of the
terms like “may” and “ideally.”235 Nevertheless, other requirements in the
certificates are quite definitive. For instance, the phrases “[s]omewhere
Public Experience, supra note 6, at 476 (describing the same).
231. According to Professor Kee, from a market perspective there was an “almost total rejection of
the Agreement as a legal instrument . . . .” Kee, MODELS, supra note 30, at 55 (emphasis omitted).
Some have argued for a more trademark-centric approach to moral rights, particularly for
contemporary artists. See, e.g., Xiyin Tang, Note, The Artist as Brand: Toward a Trademark
Conception of Moral Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 218, 230 (2012). This concept is consistent with
approaching Permissive Certificates as licenses.
232. This would require, of course, that the certificates be enforceable as contracts. At a minimum,
this would usually require a countersignature by the buyer. See supra Part II(B)(2)(a).
233. Evans Certificate, supra note 77.
234. Id.
235. For instance, “[i]f [75 lb. white offset by Georgia Pacific] paper is not available, a similar
paper may be used,” or “[t]he text is ideally reproduced at this size.” “Untitled” 1989/1990
Certificate, supra note 56, at 1.
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better than this place” and “[n]owhere better than this place” that must
appear on the two stacks of sheets are not subject to any discretion.236
Similarly, the certificate requires that “the stacks must be exhibited with
the printed side of the sheet on view.”237
For these core requirements, the Felix Gonzalez-Torres Foundation
could have a viable contract claim against a buyer who (for instance) uses
the term “then” instead of “than” in the text, or who insists on showing
the printed side down to be contrarian. Importantly, in both cases, the
contract claims are essentially providing the equivalent of a moral right of
integrity where a VARA claim would itself face challenges.238
b.

Reproductions of the Artworks Outside the Scope Permitted by the
Certificates is a Copyright Infringement

In addition to, and arguably more potent than the foregoing contractbased claims, such actions would arguably be outside the scope of the
license and thereby amount to copyright infringement.239
Understood as a copyright license, the buyer of Evans’s work is
permitted to reproduce one and only one copy of the work at a given time.
Reproducing two copies (one for home use, and one for a traveling
exhibition) is materially outside the scope of the license, just as is using
an architect’s plans for additional, unpermitted houses.240 Similarly,
Gonzalez-Torres’s contract contains clear, strong restrictions on resale, a
contractually permissible type of restraint on alienation. In particular, his
Foundation must be given a right of first refusal.241 Should the current
owners attempt to sell the piece without first offering it to the Foundation,

236. Id.
237. Id.
238. For example, among other VARA enforceability problems, it is not clear in Evans’s case that
a font change would “be prejudicial to his [] honor or reputation” or that text art is even a “work of
visual art” to begin with. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(a)(2), (3)(A), 101 (2012) (only a painting, drawing,
print, sculpture or photograph may be a “work of visual art”); 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1). In GonzalezTorres’s case, one major bar is the fact that he passed in 1996 thus rendering VARA inapplicable to
most of his works (even in those rare cases where it might otherwise attach).
239. See supra Part II(B)(1)(a).
240. LGS Architects, Inc. v. Concordia Homes of Nev., 434 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 2006), overruled
on other grounds by Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2011). As the Federal Circuit
put it, “[a]s an example, consider a license in which the copyright owner grants a person the right to make
one and only one copy of a book . . . . [o]bviously, a licensee who made a hundred copies of the book would
be liable for copyright infringement because the copying would violate the Copyright Act’s prohibition on
reproduction and would exceed the scope of the license.” Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g
& Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
241. See “Untitled” 1989/1990 Certificate, supra note 56, at 3–4.
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in violation of that provision, it would surely be a breach of contract like
the others discussed above.
More importantly, however, any reproductions made by the successor
would likely be unauthorized and thus considered outside the scope of the
copyright license and an act of copyright infringement. The existence of
copyright infringement claims strongly improves the artist’s position. In
addition to bringing in powerful copyright remedies in certain cases,
(including statutory damages and attorney’s fees)242 a copyright
infringement claim does not necessitate the existence of an enforceable,
written contract.
Finally, it is critical to note that buyers likely will not be in a position
to challenge the overall validity or enforceability of the certificate as a
contract. After all, those buyers are benefiting from the copyright license
contained within the contract. Without that license, they would (by
definition) be committing copyright infringement each time they recreate
the work. Buyers would thus be forced into the difficult litigation position
of admitting the existence of the license, and its ongoing force and effect,
while at the same time contesting their breach. This gives strong leverage
to the artist in any dispute.
c.

Material Variations Void the Authentication and Invite
Infringement Claims

As detailed above, an artist in the U.S. cannot rely on traditional
trademark or right of publicity law to prevent an owner from accurately
representing the piece to be by that artist for purposes of display or
resale.243 The signed certificate of authenticity definitively evidences the
accuracy of the attribution. This assumes, however, that the artwork does
not materially differ from that described in the certificate. If an artist can
demonstrate that the work shown differs materially from the original, then
it will no longer be insulated from trademark and right of publicity claims,
respectively.244
A starting place for any such analysis should be the parameters set by
the certificate itself. In Evans’s case, for instance, the certificate explicitly
conditions its guarantee of authenticity on “all reproduction requirements
listed above hav[ing] been met.”245 The same prohibited font alteration
that could provide Evans with a claim for breach of contract or copyright
242.
243.
244.
245.

See 17 U.S.C. §§ 504(c), 505 (2012).
Supra Part II(B)(1)(b).
Id.
Evans Certificate, supra note 77.
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infringement could thus potentially support a claim for trademark or right
of publicity infringement.246 So too with respect to the definitive
requirements in Gonzales-Torres’s works. A change to the core phrase in
the text, for instance, would almost certainly be a material alteration that
voids the certificate and exposes the owner to a trademark and right of
publicity suit.
3.

Termination

Another major implication of recognizing Permissive Certificates as
copyright licenses is that they become subject to statutory copyright
termination in the U.S. after thirty-five years.247 This allows an artist or
estate to terminate, without payment, any copyright licenses or
assignments the artist granted during their lifetime, regardless of whether
the contract allowed for such termination or not.248 The avowedly
paternalistic theory behind Congress’s decision to grant termination rights
was to give artists (and other authors) another bite at the apple so that they
may renegotiate licenses in the event that their works become
successful.249
As shown above, once a copyright license has been terminated, further
reproductions are acts of copyright infringement.250 Thus, the putative
owner of a Felix Gonzalez-Torres paper stack piece is at risk for claims
of copyright infringement by his Foundation should that owner try to
realize the piece for exhibition post-termination.251 The same would hold
for purchasers of an edition of Evans’s With the advent of Radio
Astronomy. An owner would be at risk of an infringement claim should
she reprint a new set of vinyl wall text for a new exhibition from the
authorized PDF in her possession after termination. This is true even
where a Permissive Certificate appears on its face to be a perpetual grant.

246. One wrinkle here is that the case law suggests materiality is determined from the perspective
of the purchasing public, which would here likely be buyers of contemporary art. See supra note 133.
Art buyers, however, would likely look to the certificate to guide their own views of materiality,
thereby leading to the same result.
247. This issue is explored at length in Karol, Termination, supra note 17 passim.
248. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2012).
249. Kate Darling, Occupy Copyright: A Law & Economic Analysis of U.S. Author Termination
Rights, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 147, 150–51 (2015) (describing the history of provisions).
250. See supra note 123.
251. This assumes, of course, that the work is copyrightable. See Part II(B)(2)(b). The Foundation
purports to hold the copyright in and to all works by Gonzalez-Torres. See THE FELIX GONZALEZ TORRES
FOUNDATION, http://felixgonzalez-torresfoundation.org/?page_id=56 [https://perma.cc/4KLP-X8QL].
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In short, if Permissive Certificates are recognized as copyright licenses,
then they become no more than thirty-five-year leases that the artist or the
artist’s successor may or may not choose to tolerate after that time.252
4.

Limits on Transferability

a.

Contractual Restraints

Licenses can and often do contain contractual restraints on assignment
or sublicense.253 These are generally enforced by courts according to their
own terms, but construed narrowly.254 Attempts to transfer such a nonassignable license are void, and render the attempted transferee at risk for
copyright infringement claims should it attempt to use the licensed
copyright interest.255
A surprisingly large percentage of the “Untitled” 1989/1990
Certificate—more than half of the six pages—is taken up by restrictions
on transfer. The license is assignable on its face for purposes of “loans to
exhibitions.”256 The owners may also “resell the work” in which case the
Gonzalez-Torres Foundation will issue a new certificate in the name of
the new owners—the functional equivalent of an assignment of the
original owner’s rights on resale.257
Nevertheless, the right to assign is heavily circumscribed. Most
seriously, the Foundation is granted a right of first refusal to purchase the
work should the current owners attempt to sell it.258 Even where the
Foundation chooses not to acquire the work, it is still a necessary party to

252. The same termination problems would arise under contract law, in the event of a material
breach of the contract/certificate by the artwork owner. A material breach would entitle the artist to
rescind the contract and copyright license, rendering subsequent reproductions acts of infringement.
See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.15(A) (2019).
253. See, e.g., MILGRIM ON LICENSING § 15.13 (2018) (“Typically, the licensor’s preference is that
its licensee not have the right to sublicense.”).
254. Traicoff v. Digital Media, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 2d 872, 879 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (“[P]arties may
include an anti-assignment provision in the contract, prohibiting (1) the assignment of rights, (2) the
assignment of duties, or (3) both. But, careful detail must be given to the language of such
provision.”).
255. See, e.g., Sapiano v. Millenium Entm’t, LLC, No. CV 12-8122 PSG (MAN), 2013 WL
12120262, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2013) (allowing plaintiff to move ahead with copyright
infringement claims against a party that was not a proper transferee of an exclusive copyright license).
256. “Untitled” 1989/1990 Certificate, supra note 56, at 1 (“[T]he owner has the right to assign
this assignable right.”).
257. Id. at 2.
258. Id. at 3–4.
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a resale transaction because of the detailed provisions governing
reissuance of the certificate.259
The Evans Certificate license is more ambiguous as to resale, although
it, too, would likely be interpreted to allow for transfer. In particular,
though it nowhere affirmatively grants the right to assign the reproduction
right, it does state, “[t]his certificate must accompany the work through
all transfer of ownership” and will not be reissued if lost.260 The logical
inference of this statement is that transfer of the license is permitted, so
long as the original document is itself passed to the successor.
It is possible that some clauses in certificates that purport to limit resale
would be preempted by the Copyright Act’s first sale doctrine, which
permits one who has acquired ownership of a lawfully made copy (such
as an artwork) to dispose of that copy without the permission of the
copyright owner.261 As a general matter, however, first sale cases apply to
sales of a copy of the work at issue, and are not applicable to pure
licensing transactions.262 Permissive Certificates such as those used by
Felix Gonzalez-Torres operate as pure licenses by providing permissions
without transferring existing copies. As such, they are arguably outside
the scope of the copyright first sale doctrine.
That said, one can imagine cases (for instance, that involving Damien
Hirst’s Bombay Mix discussed at the outset) where a Permissive
Certificate accompanies transfer of an actual copy of the work itself. In
those cases, under U.S. law, one could argue that the purchaser/owner’s
first sale rights trump any attempt by the copyright owner to limit resale
of that copy in the certificate.
b.

Background Legal Restraints on Transfer

In the absence of express permission to transfer an exclusive license,
the Copyright Act “does not allow a copyright licensee to transfer its

259. Id.
260. Evans Certificate, supra note 77.
261. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1177 (9th Cir. 2011).
262. Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 146–47 (1998)
(“[B]ecause the protection afforded by § 109(a) is available only to the ‘owner’ of a lawfully made
copy . . . the first sale doctrine would not provide a defense to . . . any nonowner such as a bailee, a
licensee, a consignee, or one whose possession of the copy was unlawful.”).
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rights under an exclusive license, without the consent of the original
licensor.”263 A similar rule holds for nonexclusive licensees.264
Contrary to the two examples just discussed, many—if not most—
Permissive Certificates are silent on the subject of transfer.265 In such
cases, acquirers of documents by resale or auction are at serious risk for
claims of copyright infringement should they attempt to realize the
certified works without the consent of the artist. This could be a serious
cloud on the title of very high-value acquisitions.
B.

Collectors of Art as Collectors of Permissions

Where traditional certificates of authenticity add value by confirming
artist attributions, Permissive Certificates go further by authorizing
realization of the underlying artwork. As thus far demonstrated, they do
so not only through the norms, custom, and sanction of the art world,266
but with the weight of enforceable law behind them. This lends them an
importance and value, for artworks with reproducible components, far
beyond mere retrospective authentication. They are keys that unlock the
works themselves.
Unsurprisingly, then, in disputes like those concerning the Menil
Collection/LeWitt, there is a strong focus on the certificate as such, even
where actual authorship of the wall is not in dispute. Permissive
Certificates are, and will increasingly continue to be, the locus of value
for works with conceptual or reproducible content.
Stepping further back, perhaps the most theoretical implication of
recognizing certificates of authenticity as certificates of permission is also
the most meaningful. Namely, that collectors of art (both institutional and
private) are poised to become collectors of permissions: repositories of
legal rights rather than archives of objects.

263. Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 780 (9th Cir. 2002). Some lower courts have disagreed
with this holding, yet it remains the law in the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., Traicoff v. Digital Media, Inc.,
439 F. Supp. 2d 872, 877 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (“This court also finds the reasoning in Gardner to be
unpersuasive.”).
264. 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 5:127 (“Since a nonexclusive licensee is not a copyright owner, it
may not, absent express authorization, transfer the license, nor may it, absent authorization,
sublicense.”).
265. See generally In Deed Catalog, supra note 7 passim (most certificates shown lack any
transferability language).
266. On the non-legal norms and customs of the art world in the context of dematerialized work,
see generally Guy A. Rub, Owning Nothingness Between the Legal and the Social Norms of the Art
World, 2019 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3433327
[https://perma.cc/F3SH-3HWH].
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As artists increasingly turn to dematerialized and reproducible art
practices, collections like that of Giuseppe Panza—as much an archive of
signed documents and related ephemera as one of objects—will move
from the periphery to the mainstream. We should expect to see more
museums replicating the Guggenheim’s multi-million-dollar Panza
Collection Initiative. Those other museums, too, will want and seek to
understand the rights they have been granted and restrictions by which
they have been limited with respect to Permissive Certificates in their
collections.
This practice of “invest[ing] in paper” as opposed to displaying realized
artworks was, to be sure, the subject of Judd’s deep scorn.267 The artist
dismissively described the collector of his certificates in unrelentingly
mercantile terms: “sales, purchases and sales in quantity, are exactly what
he wants to think about . . . . He really wants to talk about his investment
in art . . . but must be restrained for appearances, and must whitewash
investment for both himself and the public with idealistic platitudes.”268
Judd went so far as to compare Panza to Thersites in the Iliad in that
“[n]othing stops him or shames him.” 269
Underlying the strength of Judd’s hostility to the practice of collecting
permissions, however, is a recognition of its commercial viability,
seductiveness to collectors (private and institutional), and likely
longevity. It will become ever more common to visit the Guggenheim,
Whitney, MoMA, or the Crystal Bridges Museum in Arkansas (the
purchaser of Gonzalez-Torres’s Untitled (L.A.) for $7.67 million), not to
admire the world’s one copy of Demoiselles D’Avignon, but because only
the institution will have the legal right to spill candies and call them a
Gonzalez-Torres, or to 3D-print an authentic Josh Kline installation from
a file.
It is not difficult to imagine a paradigm shift in the future such that the
very notion of authenticity will merge with that of permission. Future
authenticity disputes, like current copyright and trademark litigations, will
center on whether an artist truly authorized or executed the legal
instrument, or the scope of any such permission, rather than whether the
artist’s hand in fact touched the object at issue.

267. Judd, supra note 1, at 643.
268. Id. at 659.
269. Id. at 632. As mentioned at the outset, in part due to Judd’s denunciation of Panza’s
recreations, the Guggenheim has decommissioned at least nine Panza fabrications of Judd’s works,
and has further decided never to fabricate other unrealized Judd paper-based works in its collection,
despite its relatively clear legal right to do so. See GROVER, supra note 30, at 168.
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CONCLUSION
Like the underlying artworks themselves, conceptual artists created
Permissive Certificates to meet and challenge the commercial pressures
of art markets. As a result, Permissive Certificates have fascinated art
historians for some time. Such documents, essentially instructions for art
generation, force society to confront fundamental ontological questions
on the nature of art, the relationship between artist, collector, and viewer,
and the influence of money and acquisitiveness on art creation.
As this Article has shown, however, Permissive Certificates are also
legal instruments. In their controlled allocation of rights to realize
artworks, they create limited, often exclusive, copyright licenses. In many
cases, they form enforceable contracts, placing duties and restrictions on
collectors far more potent than those found in moral rights legislation. In
their authorization of attribution, they negate source-based challenges to
the owner’s use of the artist’s name or brand in connection with display
or resale of the underlying works. As much as they are a grant of artistic
permission, they are also an assertion of artist control.
Permissive Certificates are also very valuable from a simple market
perspective; some sell for millions of dollars at auction, despite being
nothing more than rights on paper. Perhaps not coincidentally, this closely
parallels the technology sector of our economy, where companies are now
valued for their intangible intellectual property assets over all else. In both
cases, the value is in the legal rights, yet the value is real.
As new media artists continue to embrace reproducibility through 3Dprinted, digitally-rendered, performance-based art practices and the like,
Permissive Certificates are poised to become central to art acquisition and
control. The great private collections and museums of the future will be
vaults for contracts as much as objects, essentially repositories of
permissions. In such an era, value will inhere in the museum’s possession
of an unassailable intellectual property right rather than an unassailable
Vermeer.

